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ON THE CONVERGENCE OF CLOSED-LOOP NASH EQUILIBRIA TO
THE MEAN FIELD GAME LIMIT
DANIEL LACKER
Abstract. This paper continues the study of the mean field game (MFG) convergence problem:
In what sense do the Nash equilibria of n-player stochastic differential games converge to the
mean field game as n → ∞? Previous work on this problem took two forms. First, when
the n-player equilibria are open-loop, compactness arguments permit a characterization of all
limit points of n-player equilibria as weak MFG equilibria, which contain additional randomness
compared to the standard (strong) equilibrium concept. On the other hand, when the n-player
equilibria are closed-loop, the convergence to the MFG equilibrium is known only when the MFG
equilibrium is unique and the associated “master equation” is solvable and sufficiently smooth.
This paper adapts the compactness arguments to the closed-loop case, proving a convergence
theorem that holds even when the MFG equilibrium is non-unique. Every limit point of n-
player equilibria is shown to be the same kind of weak MFG equilibrium as in the open-loop
case. Some partial results and examples are discussed for the converse question, regarding which
of the weak MFG equilibria can arise as the limit of n-player (approximate) equilibria.
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1. Introduction
The goal of this paper is to deepen the study of the n → ∞ limit theory for n-player
stochastic differential games of mean field type. To briefly summarize the problem, specified
in full detail in Section 2, suppose n players have private state processes X = (X1, . . . ,Xn)
governed by the stochastic differential equation (SDE) system
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
,
where W 1, . . . ,W n are independent Brownian motions, and X10 , . . . ,X
n
0 are i.i.d. Note that the
drift function b is the same for each player, but the dynamics of player i’s state process depend
only on Xi itself, the empirical probability measure µnt of all players’ states, and the control α
i
of player i. Each player chooses αi from the set A of measurable functions from [0, T ] × (Rd)n
to the set A of admissible actions. That is, each player’s control is chosen as a (deterministic)
function of time and the current states of all players. The goal of player i is to maximize the
expected payoff
Jni (α
1, . . . , αn) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
n
T )
]
,
which takes the same symmetric form as the drift. The primary object of study is a closed-loop
Markovian Nash equilibrium, defined as any vector (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ An such that
Jni (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ sup
β∈A
Jni (α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn).
As is well known, Markovian Nash equilibria can be constructed by solving a parabolic PDE
system, representing the value functions of each of the n players, under suitable assumptions on
the coefficients (b, f, g); see [15, Section 2.1.4]. For a more thorough introduction to stochastic
differential games and mean field games, refer to the recent books [15, 16].
A fundamental problem in mean field game (MFG) theory is to characterize the limiting
behavior of Nash equilibrium as n→∞. More specifically, if (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) is a Nash equilib-
rium for each n, how does the associated empirical measure process µn = (µnt )t∈[0,T ] behave as
n → ∞? The heuristic put forth in the foundational work of [47, 45, 46] and [35, 48] suggests
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that the limiting behavior should be captured by what we call in this paper the strong mean
field equilibria. A strong mean field equilibrium (or strong MFE, defined precisely in Definition
2.3) is a flow of probability measures m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] such that mt = Law(X∗t ) for all t ∈ [0, T ],
where X∗ is the optimal state process for the following stochastic control problem, in which m
is treated as fixed:
sup
α
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt,mt, α(t,Xt))dt+ g(XT ,mT )
]
,
dXt = b(t,Xt,mt, α(t,Xt))dt+ dWt.
(1.1)
The majority of the MFG literature focuses on questions of existence and uniqueness of equilibria,
though there is by now a decent understanding of this convergence problem. Early results
[47, 45, 23] confirmed the MFE as the relevant limiting concept but imposed strong restrictions
on the controls αn,i, requiring them to be of the distributed form αn,i(t, x1, . . . , xn) = α̂
n,i(t, xi).
The first comprehensive results came in [43, 26], but notably working with the distinct
(and typically simpler to analyze) concept of open-loop controls. In an open-loop equilibrium,
each player specifies a control as a function of the noises (W 1, . . . ,W n) rather than the states
(X1, . . . ,Xn), and this results in completely different equilibria. See [15, pp. 72-76] for a
careful discussion of the differences between the open-loop and closed-loop regimes, which we
will review briefly in Section 2.5. For open-loop equilibria, the results of [43] give a rather
complete picture of the n → ∞ behavior: Even when the MFG equilibrium is non-unique, we
can still characterize all subsequential limits of µn as MFG equilibria, as long as we work with
a suitable weak equilibrium concept. Conversely, each of these weak equilibria can arise as the
limit of µn, for a suitable choice of approximate n-player open-loop equilibria.
Our understanding of the n → ∞ behavior of closed-loop equilibria is much less complete
in the closed-loop regime, but a major breakthrough came with the work of Cardaliaguet et
al. [10] on the master equation, an infinite-dimensional PDE that describes the value function
of the mean field game. It was shown in [10, Section 6] how to use a smooth solution of the
master equation to prove that µn converges to the (unique, in their setting) MFG equilibrium
µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ]; see also [16, Section 6.3]. More recently, these ideas were refined in [21, 22] to
derive a central limit theorem and a large deviation principle for µn, as well as nonasymptotic
bounds on various distances between µn and its limit µ. The idea of using the master equation
to prove limit theorems has proven to be powerful and fairly versatile, with [2, 19] adapting the
idea to models with finite state space.
The master equation approach, however, is limited in several ways. The most fundamental
shortcoming is that it requires the MFG equilibrium to be unique. In game theory, uniqueness
is of course the exception, not the rule, and the aforementioned papers leave open the intriguing
question of how to describe the limiting behavior of µn when there are multiple MFG equilibria.
Furthermore, it is very challenging to produce a classical solution of the master equation, and
this has been accomplished so far only in quite restricted settings [10, 20, 30].
This paper fills the gap between the open-loop and closed-loop regimes by proving (in The-
orem 2.7) a limit theorem for closed-loop equilibrium which is general enough to accommodate
non-unique MFG equilibrium. Under suitable assumptions, we show that the sequence of em-
pirical measure flows (µn) is tight in a suitable space, and every limit in distribution is what
we call a weak semi-Markov mean field equilibrium, or weak MFE for short. This equilibrium
concept (given precisely in Definition 2.5) differs from the standard strong MFE described above
in three key respects:
• The deterministic measure flow (mt)t∈[0,T ] is replaced by a stochastic one µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ].
• The controls α in (1.1) are semi-Markov, meaning α = α(t,Xt, µ), where the dependence
on the path µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ] is nonanticipative.
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• The consistency condition mt = Law(Xt) becomes conditional, µt = Law(Xt | (µs)s≤t).
The philosophy behind the weak MFE is no different from strong MFE: Each individual player
treats the mean field µ as given, describing the distribution of states among an infinite (con-
tinuum) population of competing players. Each player reacts optimally to µ, in a way that is
consistent with (i.e., reproduces) the mean field µ when aggregated over the infinity of players.
The stochastic measure flow µ should be thought of as an endogeneous common noise, in the
sense that its randomness is felt equally by all of the players. An economist might refer to this as
aggregate uncertainty [5], as opposed to (exogeneous) aggregate shocks, which one might produce
by allowing correlations between the driving Brownian motions W 1, . . . ,W n as in [17, 10].
In fact, our main limit theorem applies also to closed-loop path-dependent equilibria, in which
each player can choose a control αi = αi(t, (Xs)s≤t) depending on the entire history of the n state
processes. Under modest convexity assumptions, we show that every Markovian equilibrium
for the n-player game is also a path-dependent equilibrium, which allows us to study the two
simultaneously. This seems to be the first MFG limit theorem for path-dependent equilibria.
In the special case where the weak MFE is unique, our main limit theorem becomes a proper
convergence result: Every sequence of n-player (closed-loop) Nash equilibria converges to the
unique weak MFE. In particular, we show that the well known monotonicity condition of Lasry-
Lions [47] is sufficient (Corollary 2.9), and this recovers and generalizes the aspects of the limit
theorems of [10] pertaining to empirical measures.
The proof of our main limit theorem is based on probabilistic weak convergence and com-
pactness arguments, as well as judicious use of Markovian projection arguments which allow
one to “mimick” the time-t marginal laws of a general Itoˆ process by a Markovian diffusion (see
Theorem 2.14, quoted from [32, 9]). In a sense, the techniques build on those developed in [43]
for the open-loop regime, but the adaptation to the closed-loop case is highly non-trivial. The
central difficulty of the closed-loop regime comes from the fact that a single player’s change in
strategy can have an outsized impact on the empirical measure due to the feedback through
the other controls. If we heuristically consider such a player to be influential, the key idea be-
hind our proof is that, in a certain averaged sense, not too many players can be simultaneously
influential. See Section 2.6 for an informal discussion of the proof.
Our notion of weak MFE turns out to be equivalent in a certain sense to the notion of weak
MFG solution introduced in [17, 43]. In particular, we encounter here the same interesting
phenomenon explored in [43, Section 3], which is that not all weak MFE are mixtures of strong
MFE. That is, if we let S denote the set of strong MFE m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] in the usual sense
described in (1.1) above, then there can exist weak MFE µ such that P(µ ∈ S) < 1. In
particular, in settings with multiple MFG equilibria, the usual strong MFE concept is inadequate
for describing the limiting behavior of n-player equilibria. Notably, this phenomenon does not
appear in McKean-Vlasov systems (i.e., uncontrolled systems) or in static mean field games (i.e.,
one-shot games with no time component).
The converse to our main limit theorem turns out to be challenging to address, and we have
only partial results. We show in Theorem 2.11 that, under reasonable assumptions, every strong
MFE does indeed arise as the n → ∞ limit of some sequence of approximate n-player (closed-
loop) equilibria (see also [16, Section 6.1]). The question of if or when this is true for weak MFE
remains open.1 We give some examples of weak MFE which are not strong but which do arise
as limits of approximate n-player equilibria by exploiting an interesting connection with the
1The recent work [50] provides a remarkably detailed analysis of nearly the same questions in the context of a
specific MFG of optimal stopping, showing that certain MFE arise as the limits of n-player equilibria while others
do not; while [50] notably does not consider approximate equilibria for the n-player games, it is still a good source
of intuition for what can go wrong.
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regularization-by-noise or Peano phenomenon, which can be described as follows: Adding ǫdWt
can turn a non-unique ODE into a well-posed SDE, and in certain cases the limit in distribution
of the SDE solution as ǫ ↓ 0 is a particular mixture of the ODE solutions [1].
On the other hand, in the open-loop regime, it is by now well known that strong MFE do
arise as the limit of n-player equilibria [48, 14], and it was shown in [43] that the same is true
for any weak MFE. In this sense our results support the folklore that open-loop and closed-loop
should “converge together” as n→∞.2 This is reminiscent of the study in discrete time in [29],
though the precise use of terminology therein is different.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by specifying notation and as-
sumption, precisely defining the n-player and mean field games, and stating clearly the main
results. Notably, Section 2.6 sketches the key ideas of the proof of the main result, Theorem
2.7. Section 3 makes a first step toward proving the main theorems by relaxing the notions of
equilibrium, leading to somewhat more general forms of the main theorems which are interesting
in their own right. The heart of the paper is Section 5, devoted to the proof of Theorem 2.7.
The comparison between open-loop and closed-loop equilibria is developed further in Section 6,
with proofs of several statements from Section 2.5. Lastly, Section 7 contains some proofs and
examples surrounding the partial converse to the main limit theorem, discussed in the previous
paragraph.
2. Setup and main results
We begin by fixing some commonly used notation. We are given a time horizon T > 0 and
a dimension d ∈ N, and we write Cd for the space of continuous paths,
Cd := C([0, T ];Rd),
equipped with the sup-norm. We use boldface for vectors, such as x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n.
For a complete separable metric space (E, d), let P(E) denote the set of Borel probability
measures. We always endow P(E) with the topology of weak convergence and its corresponding
Borel σ-field. Although we will not explicitly use it, to fix ideas we suppose throughout the
paper that P(E) is equipped with the Wasserstein metric
(m,m′) 7→ inf
γ
∫
E×E
1 ∧ d(x, y) γ(dx, dy), (2.1)
where the infimum is over all γ ∈ P(E × E) with marginals m and m′. This is known to
(completely) metrize weak convergence [60, Theorem 7.12]. In particular, we will make frequent
use of the space C([0, T ];P(Rd)), implicitly equipped with the sup-metric.
For any random variable X we write L(X) for its law, or L(X |Y ) for a version of the
conditional law of X given another random variable Y , which is always well-defined up to
almost sure equality when the random variables take values in Polish spaces. We write X
d
= Y
when two random variables have the same law, and we write X ∼ λ to mean that L(X) = λ.
We are given a time horizon T > 0, a control space A, an initial state distribution λ ∈ P(Rd),
and the following functions:
(b, f) : [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd)×A→ Rd × R,
g : Rd × P(Rd)→ R.
The following assumption is in force throughout the paper:
2Interestingly, however, this connection can break down if the interactions are not sufficiently continuous; the
forthcoming [13] studies an explicitly solvable MFG with singular interactions a` la Dyson Brownian motion in
which the n→∞ limits of the open-loop and closed-loop equilibria of the n-player games are different.
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Assumption A.
(A.1) A is a compact convex subset of normed vector space.
(A.2) The functions b, f , and g are bounded and jointly continuous.
Occasionally, we will also need the following convexity assumption, which dates back to the
work of Filippov [25] and Roxin [53]. It holds, for example, if b = b(t, x,m, a) is affine in a and
f = f(t, x,m, a) concave in a, for each (t, x,m).
Assumption B. For each (t, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd), the following set is convex:
K(t, x,m) = {(b(t, x,m, a), z) : a ∈ A, z ≤ f(t, x,m, a)} ⊂ Rd × R.
2.1. The n-player games. Let n ∈ N. In the n-player game, an admissible control is a
progressively measurable function α : [0, T ] × (Cd)n → A.3 Let An denote the set of admissible
controls. A Markovian control is an admissible control α ∈ An of the form α(t, x) = α˜(t, xt),
where α˜ : [0, T ]× (Rd)n → A is Borel measurable. Let AMn ⊂ An denote the set of Markovian
controls. Accepting a mild abuse of notation, we will identify AMn with the set of Borel
measurable functions from [0, T ] × (Rd)n to A.
The state processes in the n-player game are described as follows. For any α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
Ann, by Girsanov’s theorem the following SDE system has a unique in law solution X =
(X1, . . . ,Xn):
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i(t,X))dt + dW it , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
,
where W 1, . . . ,W n are independent d-dimensonal Brownian motions, and X10 , . . . ,X
n
0 are i.i.d.
with law λ, independent of (W 1, . . . ,W n).4 We may write X[α] = (X1[α], . . . ,Xn[α]) in place
of X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) to stress which controls are being applied, and similarly µn[α] = µn.
When (α1, . . . , αn) are Markovian, the solution of the above SDE is strong, thanks to a result
of Veretennikov [59] (see also Krylov-Ro¨ckner [41, Theorem 2.1]). In particular, we can in that
case assume the solution processes are all defined on the same probability space. In general,
however, we work with weak solutions of SDEs, and keep in mind that for a different control we
may need to construct the state process X on a different probability space.
Player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} chooses αi to try to maximize
Jni (α
1, . . . , αn) := E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , α
i(t,X))dt + g(XiT , µ
n
T )
]
.
Definition 2.1. Let ǫ ≥ 0. A closed-loop (path-dependent) ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a tuple
(α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Ann such that
Jni (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ sup
β∈An
Jni (α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn)− ǫ, for i = 1, . . . , n.
A Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a tuple (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ AMnn such that5
Jni (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ sup
β∈AMn
Jni (α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn)− ǫ, for i = 1, . . . , n.
3Here, we may define progressive measurability simply to mean that α is Borel measurable and satisfies
α(t,x) = α(t,x′) whenever t ∈ [0, T ] and x,x′ ∈ (Cd)n satisfy xs = x
′
s for all s ≤ t.
4We could allow a constant invertible volatility coefficient σ ∈ Rd×d, but by redefining the state variables there
is no loss of generality in taking σ to be the identity matrix.
5 Alternative terminology is common in the engineering literature: Instead of “closed-loop path-dependent”
and “Markovian” one sometimes encounters “closed loop perfect state” and “feedback perfect state,” respectively.
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Note that the notion of Markovian Nash equilibrium involves a supremum only over AMn,
so a priori there is no clear relationship between these two equilibrium concepts. Nonetheless,
using Assumption B we prove in Section 4 that Markovian equilibria form a subset of closed-loop
equilibria, which allows us to study both types of equilibrium simultaneously:
Proposition 2.2. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold, and let ǫ ≥ 0. Then any Markovian
ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
It is well known that a Markovian Nash equilibrium for the n-player game can be constructed
from a classical solution (if one exists) of the corresponding Nash system, a system of n parabolic
PDEs representing the value functions of the n players. This observation, which goes back to
[3, 4], is discussed in contexts closer to ours in [15, Section 2.1.4] and [10, Section 1.1]. Note
also that closed-loop and Markovian equilibria can be constructed using a form of the stochastic
maximum principle [15, Section 2.2.2].
2.2. The mean field game. We next define the limiting (mean field) game, beginning with
the usual notion of equilibrium, which we call a strong equilibrium. In the following, for m ∈
C([0, T ];P(Rd)) and measurable functions α : [0, T ] × Rd → A we will encounter SDEs which
we will write in the form
dXt = b(t,Xt,mt, α(t,Xt))dt+ dWt, X0 ∼ λ.
When we say “X is the unique solution” of this SDE, we mean implicitly thatX = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] and
W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] are continuous stochastic processes defined on some common filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F,P) on which X is F-adapted, W is an F-Brownian motion, the initial state X0
has law P◦X−10 = λ and is independent of W , and the above SDE is satisfied. We avoid making
explicit mention of the probability space, as we work exlusively with distributional properties of
X. Recall in the following that we write L(Y ) for the law of a random variable Y .
Definition 2.3. We say that m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is a strong mean field equilib-
rium (MFE) if there exists a measurable function α∗ : [0, T ] × Rd → A such that the unique
solution of the SDE
dX∗t = b(t,X
∗
t ,mt, α
∗(t,X∗t ))dt+ dWt, X
∗
0 ∼ λ
satisfies the following:
(1) The consistency condition holds: mt = L(Xt) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
(2) For any measurable function α : [0, T ] × Rd → A, we have
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X∗t ,mt, α
∗(t,X∗t ))dt+ g(X
∗
T ,mT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt,mt, α(t,Xt))dt+ g(XT ,mT )
]
,
where X is the unique solution of
dXt = b(t,Xt,mt, α(t,Xt))dt+ dWt, X0 ∼ λ.
It was shown in [42, Theorem 6.2] that a strong MFE exists under Assumptions A and B,
but we will not make use of this fact. We next define our weak equilibrium concept, after first
introducing a useful terminology:
Definition 2.4. For a Polish space E, we say a function F : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ E
is semi-Markov if it is Borel measurable and satisfies F (t, x,m) = F (t, x,m′) whenever (t, x) ∈
[0, T ] ∈ Rd and m,m′ ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) satisfy ms = m′s for all s ≤ t.
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We use the term semi-Markov because the control α∗(t, x,m) depends on the state pro-
cess only at its current time (Markovian) but on the entire history of the measure flow (non-
Markovian). It is important to notice that the dependence on m is nonanticipative.
Definition 2.5. A weak semi-Markov mean field equilibrium (or simply a weak MFE ) is a tuple
(Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗,X∗, µ), where (Ω,F ,F,P) is a complete filtered probability space and:
(1) µ is a continuous F-adapted P(Rd)-valued process, W is a F-Brownian motion, and X∗
is a continuous Rd-valued F-adapted process with P ◦ (X∗0 )−1 = λ.
(2) α∗ : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A is semi-Markov.
(3) X∗0 , µ, and W are independent.
(4) The state equation holds:
dX∗t = b(t,X
∗
t , µt, α
∗(t,X∗t , µ))dt+ dWt.
(5) For every alternative semi-Markov α : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A we have
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X∗t , µt, α
∗(t,X∗t , µ)dt+ g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, α(t,Xt, µ))dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
,
where X is the solution (see Remark 2.6 below) of
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, α(t,Xt, µ))dt + dWt, X0 = X
∗
0 . (2.2)
(6) The consistency condition holds: µt = P(X
∗
t ∈ · |Fµt ) a.s. for each t ∈ [0, T ], where
Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t).
We refer also to the P(Rd)-valued process µ itself as a weak (semi-Markov) MFE. In this way,
if µ is deterministic, then it is a weak MFE if and only if it is a strong MFE. In other words, a
strong MFE is always a weak MFE.
Remark 2.6. The SDE (2.2) admits a unique strong solution (in particular, defined on the
same probability space Ω), as we discuss in detail in Appendix A. When µ is deterministic,
this follows immediately from the main results of [59, 41]. Appendix A extends this to cover
stochastic µ, as long as X0, W , and µ are independent. In particular, the solution X of (2.2) is
adapted to the complete filtration generated by the process (X∗0 ,Ws, µs)s≤t, and so is X
∗.
2.3. Limit theorems. The following is the main result of the paper:
Theorem 2.7. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold. Fix a sequence ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0. For
each n, suppose αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann is a closed-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium. Then the
associated empirical measure flow sequence µn = µn[αn] is tight as a family of C([0, T ];P(Rd))-
valued random variables, and every limit in distribution is a weak MFE.
The proof is given between Sections 4 and 5. Recalling Proposition 2.2, we immediately
deduce that Theorem 2.7 remains true if instead αn is a Markovian ǫn-Nash equilibrium. It
is well known that a suitable monotonicity condition on the payoff functions ensures that the
mean field equilibrium is unique, and we adapt these ideas to our weaker equilibrium concept.
The following theorem, inspired by the early uniqueness result of Lasry-Lions [47], is proven in
Section 6.1.
Theorem 2.8. Suppose Assumption A holds, along with the following:
(i) b(t, x,m, a) = b(t, x, a) has no mean field term.
(ii) f(t, x,m, a) = f1(t, x,m) + f2(t, x, a), for some measurable functions f1 and f2.
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(iii) The action space A is a convex, compact subset of Rk for some k.
(iv) For each (t,m) ∈ [0, T ]×P(Rd), b = b(t, x, a) is affine in (x, a), g = g(x,m) is concave in
x, and f = f(t, x,m, a) is strictly concave in (x, a).
(v) The monotonicity condition holds: For each m1,m2 ∈ P(Rd), we have∫
Rd
(f1(t, x,m1)− f1(t, x,m2))(m1 −m2)(dx) ≤ 0,∫
Rd
(g(x,m1)− g(x,m2))(m1 −m2)(dx) ≤ 0.
Then there exists a unique weak MFE, and it is in fact a strong MFE.
Noting that condition (iv) of Theorem 2.8 implies Assumption B, we may combine the
Theorems 2.8 and 2.7 to get the following propagation of chaos result:
Corollary 2.9. Suppose the assumptions of Theorem 2.8 hold. For each n, suppose αn =
(αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann is a closed-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium. Then µn = µn[αn] converges in
probability in C([0, T ];P(Rd)) to the unique strong MFE.
Corollary 2.9 is worth comparing to the results of [10, Section 2.4.4], the only previous limit
theorem for closed-loop n-player equilibria. Assuming a unique (strong) MFE and a smooth
solution of the master equation, a comparable limit theorem for µn follows from [10, Theorem
2.15], though it is not stated explicitly. Aside from the fact that they treat common noise, our
Corollary 2.9 holds under much weaker assumptions. Moreover, our main result, Theorem 2.7,
holds even when the MFE is non-unique, which seems completely out of reach of the techniques
of [10]. Of course, the smooth regime they work with affords a more refined and quantitative
description of the limit theorem including convergence of value functions; see also [21, 22].
Remark 2.10. Instead of Definition 2.5, one might propose a more natural fully-Markov equi-
librium concept, in which the control is of the form α∗(t,Xt, µt), depending only on the present
value of the measure flow. It is not clear if this smaller class of equilibria is sufficient to catch
all limit points of n-player equilibria, and we suspect not. The issue is likely the mode of con-
vergence, and the method of proof suggests the following conjecture: In the setting of Theorem
2.7, every limit point of the pre-compact sequence (L(µnt ))t∈[0,T ] in C([0, T ];P(P(Rd))) can be
written as (L(µt))t∈[0,T ] for some fully-Markov equilibrium, in the sense just described. To prove
this would likely require a Markovian projection argument for measure-valued processes, and
such technology does not seem to be available at this time.
2.4. A partial converse to the main limit theorem. Theorem 2.7 ensures that all sub-
sequential limits of closed-loop n-player approximate equilibria are weak MFE. The natural
followup question is: Are all weak MFE subsequential limits of closed-loop n-player approxi-
mate equilibria? This remains unclear in general, but this section discusses a partial result and
a sketch of how to build interesting examples, carried out in more detail in Section 7. (Notably,
if the n-player equilibria are open-loop rather than closed-loop, then the results of [43] provide
an affirmative answer to this question, and we will return to this point in Section 2.5.)
Assumption C. The drift b is Lipschitz with respect to total variation, in the following sense:
There exists c > 0 such that, for each (t, x, a) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×A and m,m′ ∈ P(Rd), we have
1
c
|b(t, x,m, a) − b(t, x,m′, a)| ≤ ‖m−m′‖TV := sup
f
∫
Rd
f d(m−m′),
where the supremum is over all measurable functions f : Rd → [−1, 1].
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Note that the metric ‖m −m′‖TV dominates the Wasserstein metric defined in (2.1), and
thus Assumption C is weaker in a sense than the Wasserstein-Lipschitz assumptions that appear
more often in the literature.
We prove the following in Section 7.3, which shows that every strong MFE arises as the limit
of n-player approximate equilibria. The only prior result of this nature seems to be the recent
[16, Theorem 6.9], which operates under different and mostly stronger assumptions. The same
conclusion is also implicit in [10, Proposition 6.3], under even heavier assumptions.
Theorem 2.11. Suppose Assumptions A, B, and C hold. Suppose m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is
a strong MFE. Then there exist ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0 and, for each n, a Markovian ǫn-Nash
equilibrium αn ∈ AMnn such that µn[αn] converges in law to m in C([0, T ];P(Rd)).
The strategy in proving this is standard: Let α∗(t, x) be the corresponding optimal control
from Definition 2.3. The state process X in Definition 2.3 is then the solution of
dXt = b(t,Xt,mt, α
∗(t,Xt))dt+ dWt, mt = L(Xt), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.3)
Then, we tell each player in the n-player game to adopt the control α∗(t,Xit). This results in
the n-particle system
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
∗(t,Xit))dt+ dW
i
t .
We expect from McKean-Vlasov limit theory that µn converges in law to m. The inequality of
the optimality condition (2) of Definition 2.3 should then translate to the approximate Nash
property in the pre-limit. The precise form of Assumption C is inspired from the recent [44],
which proves a strong form of propagation of chaos that allows us to avoid imposing continuity
assumptions on the control α∗.
It is not clear when we can expect Theorem 2.11 to extend to weak MFE. To explain what
can go wrong, suppose that (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗,X∗, µ) is a weak MFE in the sense of Definition
2.5. We then have
dX∗t = b(t,X
∗
t , µt, α
∗(t,X∗t , µ))dt+ dWt, µt = L(X∗t | Fµt ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.4)
Because X∗0 , W , and µ are independent, the law of (X
∗
0 ,W ) remains unchanged if we condition
on µ; it is then intuitively clear (and follows from Lemma A.2) that the C([0, T ];P(Rd))-valued
random variable µ belongs almost surely to the set S∗, consisting of those m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd))
which solve the McKean-Vlasov equation deterministically,
dXmt = b(t,X
m
t ,mt, α
∗(t,Xmt ,m))dt+ dWt, mt = L(Xmt ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.5)
The key point is that if µ is a weak but not strong MFE, then this McKean-Vlasov equation
(2.5) is necessarily non-unique; i.e., S∗ is not a singleton. In other words, a weak MFE can
always be expressed as a mixture of solutions of a non-unique McKean-Vlasov equation. As
a consequence, we cannot expect propagation of chaos to hold for the corresponding particle
system. That is, if we proceed as before by letting the players in the n-player game use the
(path-dependent) controls αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann given by
αn,i(t,x) = α∗
(
t, xit,
1
n
n∑
k=1
δxk
)
, x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Cd)n,
then there is no way to know if µn[αn] converges to the given µ. For non-unique McKean-Vlasov
equations, one can often show that the sequence µn[αn] is tight and that every limit point is
supported on S∗. But when S∗ is not a singleton, there is no way in general to know which
mixture(s) will be “picked out” by the limit n→∞.
We will discuss these ideas further in Section 7, which includes examples of weak MFE which
are not strong MFE but which do arise as the limits of n-player (approximate) Nash equilibria.
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Section 7.3, in particular, gives an example of an interesting kind of weak MFE, discussed also in
[43, Section 3]: If S ⊂ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) denotes the set of strong MFE, then there can exist weak
semi-Markov MFE µ with P(µ ∈ S) < 1. But we do not address an intriguing open problem:
Can one construct a weak MFE µ satisfying P(µ ∈ S) < 1 which arises as the limit of n-player
approximate equilibria? In the examples we give in Section 7 of weak MFE which arise as the
limits of n-player approximate equilibria, the weak MFE are always mixtures of strong MFE;
that is, they satisfy P(µ ∈ S) = 1. Note, on the other hand, that it is known that all weak MFE
do indeed arise as limits of open-loop n-player approximate equilibria; see Theorem 2.12 below,
essentially quoted from [43].
2.5. Closed-loop versus open-loop equilibria. The parallel limit theory for open-loop n-
player equilibria is better understood and allows for some interesting comparisons between the
two regimes. First, we recall the definition of open-loop equilibrium. In this section, we impose
stronger continuity assumptions on b and f , so that we may apply the results of [43]:
Assumption D. There exist c > 0 such that
∫
Rd
|x|2 λ(dx) <∞ and, for each t ∈ [0, T ], a ∈ A,
x, x′ ∈ Rd, and m,m′ ∈ P(Rd), we have
|b(t, x,m, a) − b(t, x′,m′, a)| ≤ c(|x− x′|+W1(m,m′)),
where W1 denotes the Wasserstein metric, defined by W1(m,m′) = infγ
∫
Rd×Rd |x− y|γ(dx, dy),
where the infimum is over all probability measures γ on Rd × Rd with marginals m and m′.
Moreover, the objective function f = f(t, x,m, a) satisfies the uniform continuity condition
lim
(x′,m′)→(x,m)
sup
a∈A
|f(t, x′,m′, a)− f(t, x,m, a)| = 0,
for all (t, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd).
The open-loop n-player game is defined on a fixed filtered probability space (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn),
supporting independent Fn-Brownian motions and i.i.d. Fn0 -measurable initial states (X10 , . . . ,Xn0 )
with law λ.6 Let An denote the set of F
n-adapted A-valued processes. For α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈
Ann, define the expected payoff
Jni (α) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , α
i
t)dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
n
T )
]
,
where (X1, . . . ,Xn) is the unique strong solution (recalling Assumption D) of the SDE
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i
t)dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
.
We may again write µn = µn[α] to emphasize the dependence on the choice of control. For
ǫ ≥ 0, an open-loop ǫ-equilibrium is a tuple αn = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Ann such that
Jni (α) ≥ sup
β∈An
Jni (α
1, . . . , αi−1, β, αi+1, . . . , αn)− ǫ.
It cannot be stressed enough that open-loop and closed-loop equilibria can be very different. See
[18] for an example of an n-player game in which the unique (and explicit) open-loop and closed-
loop equilibria are distinct, although they converge to the same limit as n → ∞. Open-loop
equilibria are most often found using the stochastic maximum principle [15, Section 2.2.1].
We will prove in Section 6 a correspondence between our notion of weak MFE and the
equilibrium concept used in [43]. Then, [43, Theorems 3.4] rewrites as follows:
6The filtration Fn does not need to be the minimal one generated by the initial states and Brownian motions.
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Theorem 2.12. Suppose Assumptions A, B, and D hold. If, for each n, we are given an
open-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium α
n = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann for some ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0, then
µn[αn] is tight in C([0, T ];P(Rd)), and every limit in distribution is a weak MFE. Conversely,
for every weak MFE µ, we may find, for each n, ǫn ≥ 0 and an open-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium
αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) such that ǫn → 0 and µn[αn] converges in law to µ in C([0, T ];P(Rd)).
A proof is given at the end of Section 6. Combining Theorems 2.7 and 2.12, we immediately
deduce that closed-loop equilibria can be approximated by open-loop equilibria:
Corollary 2.13. Suppose Assumptions A, B, and D hold. Let ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0. For each
n, let αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann be a closed-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium. Then there exist δn ≥ 0
with δn → 0 and, for each n, an open-loop δn-Nash equilibrium βn = (βn,1, . . . , βn,n) ∈ Ann
such that µn[αn] and µn[βn] converge together in law in C([0, T ];P(Rd)). Precisely, for each
ϕ ∈ Cb(C([0, T ];P(Rd))) we have
lim
n→∞E[ϕ(µ
n[αn])]− E[ϕ(µn[βn])] = 0.
2.6. Ideas of the proof of the main limit theorem. In this section we informally explain
some of the main ideas of the rather lengthy proof of Theorem 2.7, which comes in Section
5. Tightness is straightforward here and fairly standard, so we mostly focus on the two bigger
challenges of identifying the dynamics at the limit (properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 2.5)
and proving the optimality of the limiting control (property (5) of Definition 2.5).
A key tool in identifying the limiting dynamics is (a special case of) the Markovian projection
theorem, due originally to Gyo¨ngy [32, Theorem 4.6] and later generalized in [9, Corollary 3.7]:
Theorem 2.14 (Markovian projection). Let (Ω,F ,F,P) be a filtered probability space supporting
an F-adapted continuous process X and an F-Brownian motion W . Suppose b = (bt)t∈[0,T ] is a
bounded F-progressively measurable process such that, almost surely,
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
bs ds+Wt, t ∈ [0, T ].
Then there exists a bounded measurable function b̂ : [0, T ]× Rd → Rd such that
b̂(t,Xt) = E[bt |Xt], a.s., t ∈ [0, T ],
and, moreover, the unique strong solution of the SDE
dYt = b̂(t, Yt)dt+ dWt, Y0 = X0,
satisfies Yt
d
= Xt for each t ∈ [0, T ].
2.6.1. Limiting dynamics. We want to show that, for any weak limit µ of (µn), we may construct
a tuple (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗,X∗, µ) and such that properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 2.5 hold.
Much of this argument is an embellishment of a well-established martingale approach for deriving
the McKean-Vlasov limit for interacting diffusions, developed for instance in [51, 31]. A first
difference is that here we work with the extended empirical measure
µn =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(Xk ,αn,k).
Here we view Xk as a Cd-valued random variable and αn,k = αn,k(t,X) as a random variable
taking values in the space V of relaxed or measure-valued controls, defined in Section 5.2; the
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space V is essentially a convenient compactification of the space L0([0, T ];A) of measurable
A-valued paths. First, we show that every weak limit µ of (µn) satisfies∫
Rd
ϕd(µt − µ0) =
∫
Cd×V
∫ t
0
∫
A
(
b(s, xs, µs, a) · ∇ϕ(xs) + 1
2
∆ϕ(xs)
)
qs(da)dsµ(dx, dq)
almost surely, for each smooth test function ϕ on Rd, where µt = µ ◦ [(x, q) 7→ xt]−1 is the
marginal flow associated to the x variable.
The above integral equation closely resembles the weak or integrated form of a Fokker-Planck
equation. Instead of an integral
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
... µs(dx)ds appearing on the right-hand side, we have
a more complicated expression involving the integral with the respect to µ. Drawing intuition
from the Markovian Projection Theorem 2.14, we would like to condition on the marginal flow
(µt)t∈[0,T ], in order to “project away the extra randomness” in some sense. Ultimately, we build
(cf. Lemma 5.3) a semi-Markov control α∗ : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A such that∫
Rd
ϕd(µt − µ0) =
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
(
b(s, x, µs, α
∗(t, x, µ)) · ∇ϕ(x) + 1
2
∆ϕ(x)
)
µs(dx)ds,
almost surely, for each ϕ, and such that the expected value of objective function is preserved in
a suitable sense. This now says that (µt)t∈[0,T ] almost surely solves a Fokker-Planck equation,
which we can identify with the solution of an SDE. In fact, this SDE is of McKean-Vlasov
type, because µ itself appears nonlinearly in the coefficients b and α∗, and this line of reasoning
eventually leads us to properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 2.5.
2.6.2. Optimality at the limit. Suppose now that we have proven the claimed tightness of Theo-
rem 2.7 and also that for any limit point µ of (µn) we may construct a tuple (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗,X∗, µ)
such that properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 2.5 hold. The final and most difficult step is to
check that this tuple satisfies the optimality property (5) of Definition 2.5. In the following, we
work with a relabeled convergent subsequence and assume µn converges in law to µ.
The general strategy, reminiscent of Gamma-convergence arguments, is to choose an arbi-
trary alternative control α : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A, and give it to each of the players
in the n-player game. Precisely, for each n and each k = 1, . . . , n, define the n state processes
Y k = (Y k,1, . . . , Y k,n) by
dY k,kt = b(t, Y
k,k
t , µ
n,k
t , α(t, Y
k,k
t , µ
n,k))dt+ dW kt , µ
n,k =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δY n,k,j
dY k,it = b(t, Y
k,i
t , µ
n,k
t , α
n,i(t,Y k))dt+ dW it , i 6= k,
with initial states Y k,i0 = X
i
0. The state process Y
k differes from the equilibrium state process
X[(αn,1, . . . , αn,n)] only in that we switched player k’s control from αn,k to α.
The assumed ǫn-Nash equilibrium property of (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n) then implies that
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xkt , µ
n
t , α
n,k(t,Xn))dt+ g(XkT , µ
n
T )
]
≥ −ǫn + 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y k,kt , µ
n,k
t , α(t, Y
k,k
t , µ
n,k))dt+ g(Y k,kT , µ
n,k
T )
]
. (2.6)
We then wish to take limits on both sides. First, the arguments of Section 2.6.1 allow us to
identify the limit of the left-hand side of (2.6) as precisely the left-hand side of the inequality in
(5) of Definition 2.5. What remains is to show that the right-hand side of (2.6) along the same
subsequence converges to the right-hand side of the inequality in (5) of Definition 2.5.
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This last point is the technical crux of the argument. It is not obvious at first how to
approach this, because we know very little about the controls αn,1, . . . , αn,n. Intuitively, one
is tempted claim that, because we have only switched one single agent’s control, µn,k should
be close in some sense to µn, for each k. The challenge comes from the closed-loop nature of
the controls; if one player switches controls, then all of the other players controls react to the
change in the state process. It could be the case that all of the controls αn,1, . . . , αn,n depend
very heavily on, say, player 1’s state process, in which case a change in control from this player
1 would have a strong influence on the empirical measure.
While we cannot show that µn,k and µn have the same limiting behavior for each k, we are
able to show that L(µn) and 1
n
∑n
k=1L(µn,k) have the same limiting behavior, in the sense that
the total variation distance between these two measures converges to zero as n → ∞. Indeed,
supposing the state process X is defined on the probability space (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn), we may
define an equivalent probability measure Qn,k by setting dQn,k/dPn := ζn,kT , where the positive
martingale (ζn,kt )t∈[0,T ] is given as the unique solution of the SDE
dζn,kt = ζ
n,k
t
(
b(t,Xkt , µ
n
t , α(t,X
k
t , µ
n))− b(t,Xkt , µnt , αn,k(t,X))
)
· dW kt , ζn,k0 = 1.
By Girsanov’s theorem and uniqueness of the SDEs, we have L(Y k) = Qn,k ◦X−1. Hence, for
any bounded measurable function h,
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[h(µn,k)] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[ζn,kT h(µ
n)]. (2.7)
Because the Brownian motions W k are independent, the process 1
n
∑n
k=1 ζ
n,k
t is a martingale
with quadratic variation up to time s given by
1
n2
n∑
k=1
∫ s
0
∣∣∣b(t,Xkt , µnt , α(t,Xkt , µn))− b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , αn,k(t,X))∣∣∣2dt,
which is of order 1/n because b is bounded. Hence, 1
n
∑n
k=1 ζ
n,k
T → 1 in probability, and from
(2.7) we deduce that
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[h(µn,k)]− E[h(µn)] = 0. (2.8)
Most of the intuition behind this proof is contained in this argument that L(µn) and
1
n
∑n
k=1L(µn,k) have the same limiting behavior, but one important additional point is worth
mentioning: The right-hand side of (2.6) can be written as the integral of a fixed (n-independent)
function with respect to the measure 1
n
∑n
k=1L(Y k,k, µn,k), and it is this measure whose limiting
behavior we should identify, not just 1
n
∑n
k=1L(µn,k). To this end, for any bounded measurable
function h, write
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[h(Y k,k, µn,k)] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
E[ζn,kT h(X
k, µn)].
The limiting behavior of this expression can be identified by studying the (d + 1)-dimensional
particle system (Xk, ζn,k)nk=1, following the classical martingale approach for McKean-Vlasov
systems mentioned in Section 2.6.1.
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3. Relaxed equilibria
Our proofs will make heavy use of relaxed or randomized controls, essentially replacing
A-valued controls with P(A)-valued controls, which by now have a long history in stochastic
optimal control theory [27, 39] for their useful compactness properties. Relaxed controls were
employed in an MFG context [42, 17, 43], and we will use them in the same way. It is worth
noting, however, that while they are certainly mathematically convenient, relaxed controls also
admit a natural interpretation in a game-theoretic context as mixed strategies.
3.1. Relaxed n-player games. We begin by extending the equilibrium concepts for n-player
games of Section 2.1. Write Rn for the set of progressively measurable functions Λ : [0, T ] ×
(Cd)n → P(A), and let RMn denote the subset of functions of the form Λ(t, x) = Λ˜(t, xt) for
some measurable function Λ˜ : [0, T ] × (Rd)n → P(A). Via the embedding A ∋ a 7→ δa ∈ P(A),
we may view An and AMn as subsets of Rn, and we have the following natural inclusions:
AMn ⊂ An ⊂ Rn, AMn ⊂ RMn ⊂ Rn.
The state process and objective functions are defined for relaxed controls Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Rnn
as follows:
dXit =
∫
A
b(t,Xit , µ
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,X)(da)dt + dW it ,
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λn) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,X)(da)dt + g(XiT , µ
n
T )
]
.
We may writeX[Λ] = (X1[Λ], . . . ,Xn[Λ]) in place ofX = (X1, . . . ,Xn) to stress which controls
are being applied, and similarly we may write µn[Λ] in place of µn.
Definition 3.1. Let ǫ ≥ 0. A relaxed closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a tuple (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Rnn
such that
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λn) ≥ sup
β∈Rn
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λi−1, β,Λi+1, . . . ,Λn)− ǫ, for i = 1, . . . , n.
A relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium is a tuple (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ RMnn such that
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λn) ≥ sup
β∈RMn
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λi−1, β,Λi+1, . . . ,Λn)− ǫ, for i = 1, . . . , n.
The following trio of propositions, along with Proposition 2.2, will show that the four equi-
librium concepts described in Definitions 2.1 and 3.1 are roughly equivalent, if we accept both
assumptions A and B. The proofs are given in Section 4.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose Assumption A holds, and let ǫ ≥ 0. Then any relaxed Markovian
ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold, and let ǫ ≥ 0. Then:
(a) Any Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
(b) Any closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium is also a relaxed closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold, and let ǫ ≥ 0. Then:
(a) For any relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ RMnn, there exists a
Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ AMnn such that X[Λ] d=X[α].
(b) For any relaxed closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ Rnn, there exists a closed-
loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Ann such that X[Λ] d=X[α].
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Some notation helps to summarize the above propositions. Fix ǫ ≥ 0, let A∗,ǫn ⊂ Ann denote
the set of closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibria. Similarly, define AM∗,ǫn , R∗,ǫn , and RM∗,ǫn respectively
as the sets of Markovian, relaxed closed-loop, and relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibria. We may
summarize the relations of Propositions 2.2, 3.2, and 3.3 by writing
AM∗,ǫn ⊂ A∗,ǫn ⊂ R∗,ǫn , AM∗,ǫn ⊂ RM∗,ǫn ⊂ R∗,ǫn .
Moreover, we can think of Proposition 3.4(a) (resp. (b)) as reducing AM∗,ǫn ⊂ RM∗,ǫn (resp.
A∗,ǫn ⊂ R∗,ǫn ) to equality, if we are content to focus only on the law of the state process X.
Precisely, under Assumptions A and B, we have the following relationships between subsets of
P((Cd)n):
{L(X[Λ]) : Λ ∈ AM∗,ǫn } = {L(X[Λ]) : Λ ∈ RM∗,ǫn }
⊂ {L(X[Λ]) : Λ ∈ R∗,ǫn }
= {L(X[Λ]) : Λ ∈ A∗,ǫn }.
(3.1)
Recall that our main result, Theorem 2.7, involves only the law of the state process X. Thanks
to the above propositions, we may simultaneously cover all four of these possibilities by focusing
solely on the laws of closed-loop Markovian equilibria, i.e., A∗,ǫn .
We will make no claims throughout the paper regarding existence of equilibria for n-player
games, but we provide some references. As we have mentioned, Markovian Nash equilibria (the
set AM∗,0n , in the notation of the previous paragraph) are by the most commonly studied in
the literature can be found by solving a system of n Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations.
Relaxed Markovian equilibria are far less common, but the notable paper of Borkar and Ghosh
[7] has several theorems on existence (i.e., RM∗,0n 6= ∅). While their discussion of finite horizon
problems is limited to the final sentence of the paper, it is clear that the techniques they develop
for infinite-horizon problems can be easily adapted. Closed-loop path-dependent equilibria have
appeared with some frequency in the literature on two-player stochastic differential games [11,
33]. They arise quite naturally in the BSDE-based weak formulation of Hamadene-Lepeltier [33],
which reduces the existence of Nash equilibria to the solution of a BSDE (which is nothing but
the stochastic representation of the corresponding HJB equation). The extension to the n-player
setting is written in the lecture notes [12, Section 5.3.2], but be careful that our notion of closed-
loop equilibrium is called “open-loop” therein. Lastly, we are unaware of any discussion of relaxed
closed-loop equilibria in prior literature, but it is useful at the very least as an intermediary in
establishing the relations in (3.1).
3.2. Relaxed mean field equilibria. We next extend the MFG equilibrium concepts (Defini-
tions 2.3 and 2.5) of Section 2.2 to the relaxed setting:
Definition 3.5. We say that m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is a strong relaxed mean field
equilibrium (or simply a strong RMFE ) if there exists a measurable function Λ∗ : [0, T ]×Rd →
P(A) such that the unique solution of the SDE
dX∗t =
∫
A
b(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt + dWt, X
∗
0 ∼ λ
satisfies the following:
(1) The consistency condition holds: mt = L(Xt) for all t ∈ [0, T ].
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(2) For any measurable function Λ : [0, T ]× Rd → P(A), we have
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt + g(X
∗
T ,mT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt,mt, a)Λ(t,Xt)(da)dt + g(XT ,mT )
]
,
where X is the unique solution of
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt,mt, a)Λ(t,Xt)(da)dt + dWt, X0 ∼ λ.
It was shown in [42, Theorem 6.2] that a strong MFE exists under Assumption A, though
we will not need this fact. Recall from Definition 2.4 the notion of a semi-Markov function.
Definition 3.6. A weak semi-Markov relaxed mean field equilibrium (or simply a weak RMFE )
is a tuple (Ω,F ,F,P,W,Λ∗,X∗, µ), where (Ω,F ,F,P) is a complete filtered probability space
and:
(1) µ is a continuous F-adapted P(Rd)-valued process, W is a F-Brownian motion, and X∗
is a continuous Rd-valued F-adapted process with P ◦ (X∗0 )−1 = λ.
(2) Λ∗ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A) is semi-Markov.
(3) X∗0 , µ, and W are independent.
(4) The state equation holds:
dX∗t =
∫
A
b(t,X∗t , µt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t , µ)(da)dt + dWt. (3.2)
(5) For every alternative Λ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A) satisfying (2), we have
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t , µt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t , µ)(da)dt + g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
,
where X is the solution (recall Remark 2.6) of
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + dWt, X0 ∼ λ.
(6) The consistency condition holds: µt = P(X
∗
t ∈ · |Fµt ) a.s. for each t ∈ [0, T ], where
Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t).
We refer also to the P(Rd)-valued process µ itself as a weak RMFE.
Similar to the relationships of Section 3.1, under Assumptions A and B we prove in Section
4 that MFE and relaxed MFE induce the same measure flows:
Proposition 3.7. Suppose Assumptions A and B hold. Then every strong RMFE is a strong
MFE, and every strong MFE is a strong RFME. Similarly, on the level of the measure flow µ,
every weak RMFE is a weak MFE, and every weak MFE is a RMFE.
Remark 3.8. Recall from Remark 2.6 that the SDEs in (3.2) admit unique strong solutions,
and in particular X∗ is necessarily adapted to the complete filtration generated by the process
(X∗0 ,Ws, µs)s≤t. With this and property (3) of Definition 3.6, we easily deduce that L(X∗t | Fµt ) =
L(X∗t |µ) a.s., for each t ∈ [0, T ], which will be useful later.
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3.3. Extensions of the limit theorems. This section collects some generalizations of the
main results announced in Section 2, which do not require the convexity Assumption B. The
results of the previous two subsections show how the various equilibrium concepts related to
each other if we impose Assumption B, and this is how we will deduce the results of Section 2
from those announced here.
Theorem 3.9. Suppose Assumption A holds. Fix a sequence ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0. For each n,
suppose αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann is a closed-loop ǫn-Nash equilibrium. Then the associated
empirical measure flow sequence µn = µn[αn] is tight as a family of C([0, T ];P(Rd))-valued
random variables, and every limit in distribution is a weak RMFE.
If we impose both Assumption A and B, then Proposition 3.7 tells us that weak RMFE and
weak MFE are one and the same. Thus, our main result, Theorem 2.7, follows from Theorem
3.9. Recall also the relations summarized in (3.1). Under Assumptions A and B, we deduce
that Theorem 3.9 remains valid when αn is instead assumed to be any of the four types of
equilibrium described in Definitions 2.1 and 3.1.
Similarly, we may deduce the converse Theorem 2.11 from Proposition 3.4(a) the following
generalization to relaxed equilibria:
Theorem 3.10. Suppose Assumptions A and C hold. Suppose m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is a strong
RMFE. Then there exist ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0 and, for each n, a relaxed Markovian ǫn-Nash
equilibrium Λn ∈ RMnn such that µn[Λn] converges in law to m in C([0, T ];P(Rd)).
Sections 5 and 7.1 are devoted to the proofs of Theorems 3.9 and 3.10, respectively. We
might lastly state a form of Theorem 2.12 without Assumption B, as long as we use weak
RMFE instead of weak MFE, but we opt not to write this out explicitly.
4. Relating the various equilibrium concepts
This section proves the various relationships between different equilibrium concepts of Defi-
nitions 2.1 and 3.1, announced in Propositions 2.2, 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. We also prove Proposition
3.7, which relates MFE to RMFE.
4.1. Proof of Proposition 3.2. Let ǫ ≥ 0, and fix a relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium
Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈ RMnn. The goal is to show that Λ is also a relaxed closed-loop ǫ-Nash
equilibrium. The state processes X =X[Λ] solve the SDE system
dXit =
∫
A
b(t,Xit , µ
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,Xt)(da)dt + dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
.
Let β ∈ Rn be an alternative relaxed closed-loop control. We will focus on player 1, showing
that
Jn1 (Λ
1, . . . ,Λn) ≥ Jn1 (β,Λ2, . . . ,Λn)− ǫ. (4.1)
The argument for other players i 6= 1 is identical. To proceed, let Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y n) :=
X[β,Λ2, . . . ,Λn] be the state processes in which players i 6= 2 still use Λi:
dY 1t =
∫
A
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a)β(t,Y )(da)dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY it =
∫
A
b(t, Y it , ν
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,Yt)(da)dt + dW
i
t , i 6= 1
νnt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δY kt
.
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Define β˜ ∈ RMn by setting β˜(t,x) = E[β(t,Y ) |Yt = x], noting that the existence of a jointly
measurable version of this conditional mean measure is demonstrated by Lemma C.2. More
precisely, this defines a Borel measurable function β˜ : [0, T ]× (Rd)n → P(A) such that∫
A
ϕ(t,Yt, a)β˜(t,Yt)(da) = E
[∫
A
ϕ(t,Yt, a)β(t,Y )(da)
∣∣∣Yt] , a.s., a.e. t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.2)
By Theorem 2.14, the unique solution Y˜ = (Y˜ 1, . . . , Y˜ n) of the SDE system
dY˜ 1t =
∫
A
b(t, Y˜ 1t , ν˜
n
t , a)β˜(t, Y˜t)(da)dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY˜ it =
∫
A
b(t, Y˜ it , ν˜
n
t , a)Λ
i(t, Y˜t)(da)dt + dW
i
t , i 6= 1
ν˜nt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ
Y˜ kt
.
satisfies Y˜t
d
= Yt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Using Fubini’s theorem and (4.2), we find
Jn1 (β,Λ
2, . . . ,Λn) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a)β(t,Y )(da)dt + g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a)β˜(t,Yt)(da)dt+ g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y˜ 1t , ν˜
n
t , a)β˜(t, Y˜t)(da)dt+ g(Y˜
1
T , ν˜
n
T )
]
= Jn1 (β˜,Λ
2, . . . ,Λn)
≤ Jn1 (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) + ǫ.
Indeed, the last inequality follows from the assumption that (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) is a relaxed Markovian
ǫ-Nash equilibrium. 
4.2. Proof of Proposition 3.3.
Proof of (a): Let ǫ ≥ 0, and fix a Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ AMnn.
The goal is to show that α is also a relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium. The state processes
X =X[α] solve the SDE system
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt .
Let β ∈ RMn be an alternative relaxed control. We will focus on player 1, showing that
Jn1 (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ Jn1 (β, α2, . . . , αn)− ǫ. (4.3)
The argument for other players i 6= 1 is identical. To proceed, let Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y n) =
X[β, α2, . . . , αn] be the state processes in which players i 6= 2 still use αi:
dY 1t =
∫
A
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a)β(t,Yt)(da)dt + dW
1
t ,
dY it = b(t, Y
i
t , ν
n
t , α
i(t,Yt))dt+ dW
i
t , i 6= 1
νnt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δY kt
.
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Recalling the definition of the convex set K(t, x,m) from Assumption B, we have∫
A
(
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a), f(t, Y
1
t , ν
n
t , a)
)
β(t,Yt)(da) ∈ K(t, Y 1t , νnt ).
Let Ln : (R
d)n → P(Rd) denote the empirical measure map, Ln(x) = 1n
∑n
k=1 δxk . Using
a measurable selection theorem [34, Theorem A.9], we may find a measurable function α˜ :
[0, T ]× (Rd)n → A such that, for each x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n,
b(t, x1, Ln(x), α˜(t,x)) =
∫
A
b(t, x1, Ln(x), a)β(t,x)(da) (4.4)
and ∫
A
f(t, x1, Ln(x), a)β(t,x)(da) ≤ f(t, x1, Ln(x), α˜(t,x)).
The first of these identities implies that in fact
dY 1t = b(t, Y
1
t , ν
n
t , α˜(t,Yt))dt+ dW
1
t ,
and in particular Y
d
=X[α˜, α2, . . . , αn], while the second implies
Jn1 (β, α
2, . . . , αn) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , a)β(t,Yt)(da)dt + g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , α˜(t,Yt))dt+ g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
= Jn1 (α˜, α
2, . . . , αn)
≤ Jn1 (α1, . . . , αn) + ǫ.
Indeed, the last inequality follows from the assumption that (α1, . . . , αn) is a Markovian ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of (b): This proof is identical to that of part (a), except that all of the controls involved
(namely, αi and β) are closed-loop (path-dependent) instead of Markovian.
4.3. Proof of Proposition 2.2.
This combines ideas of both of the previous proofs. Let ǫ ≥ 0, and fix a Markovian ǫ-Nash
equilibrium α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ AMnn. The goal is to show α is a closed-loop ǫ-Nash equilibrium.
The state processes X =X[α] solve the SDE system
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
.
Let β ∈ An be an alternative closed-loop control. We will focus on player 1, showing that
Jn1 (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ Jn1 (β, α2, . . . , αn)− ǫ. (4.5)
Let Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y n) = X[β, α2, . . . , αn] be the state processes in which players i 6= 2 still use
αi:
dY 1t = b(t, Y
1
t , ν
n
t , β(t,Y ))dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY it = b(t, Y
i
t , ν
n
t , α
i(t,Yt))dt+ dW
i
t , i 6= 1
νnt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δY kt
.
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Recalling the definition of the convex set K(t, x,m) from Assumption B, notice that
E
[
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β(t,Y )) |Yt
] ∈ K(t, Y 1t , νnt ), a.s.,
for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Using a measurable selection theorem [34, Theorem A.9], we may find a
measurable function β˜ : [0, T ]× (Rd)n → A such that
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β˜(t,Yt)) = E
[
b(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β(t,Y )) |Yt
]
, a.s. (4.6)
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β˜(t,Yt)) ≥ E
[
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β(t,Y )) |Yt
]
, a.s., (4.7)
for each t ∈ [0, T ]. By Theorem 2.14, the unique solution Y˜ = (Y˜ 1, . . . , Y˜ n) of the SDE system
dY˜ 1t = b(t, Y˜
1
t , ν˜
n
t , β˜(t, Y˜t))dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY˜ it = b(t, Y˜
i
t , ν˜
n
t , α
i(t, Y˜t))dt+ dW
i
t , i 6= 1
ν˜nt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ
Y˜ kt
.
satisfies Y˜t
d
= Yt for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that Y˜ d= X[β˜, α2, . . . , αn]. Use Fubini’s theorem and
(4.7) to get
Jn1 (β, α
2, . . . , αn) = E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β(t,Y ))dt+ g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y 1t , ν
n
t , β˜(t,Yt))dt+ g(Y
1
T , ν
n
T )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y˜ 1t , ν˜
n
t , β˜(t, Y˜t))dt+ g(Y˜
1
T , ν˜
n
T )
]
= Jn1 (β˜, α
2, . . . , αn)
≤ Jn1 (α1, . . . , αn) + ǫ.
Indeed, the last inequality follows from the assumption that (α1, . . . , αn) is a Markovian ǫ-Nash
equilibrium.

4.4. Proof of Proposition 3.4.
Proof of (a): Let ǫ ≥ 0, and fix a relaxed Markovian ǫ-Nash equilibrium Λ = (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) ∈
RMnn. The state processes X =X[Λ] solve the SDE system
dXit =
∫
A
b(t,Xit , µ
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,Xt)(da)dt + dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
.
Let Ln : (R
d)n → P(Rd) denote the empirical measure map, Ln(x) = 1n
∑n
k=1 δxk . Recalling the
definition of K(t, x,m) from Assumption B, it holds for each t ∈ [0, T ], x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n,
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that∫
A
(
b(t, xi, Ln(x), a), f(t, xi, Ln(x), a)
)
Λi(t,x)(da) ∈ K(t, xi, Ln(x)).
Using a measurable selection theorem [34, Theorem A.9], we may find a measurable function
αi : [0, T ] × (Rd)n → A such that, for each x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n and t ∈ [0, T ],
b(t, xi, Ln(x), α
i(t,x)) =
∫
A
b(t, xi, Ln(x), a)Λ
i(t,x)(da) (4.8)
22 DANIEL LACKER
and ∫
A
f(t, xi, Ln(x), a)Λ
i(t,x)(da) ≤ f(t, xi, Ln(x), αi(t,x)).
The first of these identities implies that in fact X solves the SDE system
dXit = b(t,X
i
t , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ dW
i
t ,
i.e., X =X[α1, . . . , αn], while the second implies
Jni (Λ
1, . . . ,Λn) = E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,Xt)(da)dt + g(X
i
T , µ
n
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xit , µ
n
t , α
i(t,Xt))dt+ g(X
i
T , µ
n
T )
]
= Jni (α
1, . . . , αn). (4.9)
Now, let us show that (α1, . . . , αn) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium. Fix an alternative Markovian
control β ∈ AMn. We will focus on player 1, showing that
Jn1 (α
1, . . . , αn) ≥ Jn1 (β, α2, . . . , αn)− ǫ. (4.10)
To proceed, let Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y n) = X[β,Λ2, . . . ,Λn] be the state processes in which players
i 6= 2 still use the relaxed controls Λi:
dY 1t = b(t, Y
1
t , ν
n
t , β(t,Yt))dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY it =
∫
A
b(t, Y it , ν
n
t , a)Λ
i(t,Yt)(da)dt + dW
i
t , i 6= 1
νnt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δY kt
.
Using (4.8) we may write
dY it = b(t, Y
i
t , ν
n
t , α
i(t,Yt))dt+ dW
i
t , i 6= 1,
i.e., Y
d
=X[β, α2, . . . , αn]. Hence, since (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) is ǫ-Nash, we may use (4.9) to get
Jn1 (β, α
2, . . . , αn) = Jn1 (β,Λ
2, . . . ,Λn) ≤ Jn1 (Λ1, . . . ,Λn) + ǫ
≤ Jn1 (α1, . . . , αn) + ǫ.
Proof of (b): This proof is identical to that of part (a), except that all of the controls involved
(namely, Λi, αi, and β) are closed-loop (path-dependent) instead of Markovian. 
4.5. Proof of Proposition 3.7.
We prove the claims only for weak MFE, as the strong MFE is a special case of a deterministic
weak MFE. We begin with a preparatory argument. Let Λ : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A)
be any semi-Markov function (recall Definition 2.4). Recalling the definition of the convex set
K(t, x,m) from Assumption B, note that for (t, x,m) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd)) we have∫
A
(
b(t, x,mt, a), f(t, x,mt, a)
)
Λ(t, x,m)(da) ∈ K(t, x,mt).
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Using a measurable selection theorem [34, Theorem A.9], we may find a semi-Markov function
αΛ : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A such that, for each (t, x,m),
b(t, x,mt, α
Λ(t, x,m)) =
∫
A
b(t, x,m, a)Λ(t, x,m)(da)
and ∫
A
f(t, x,m, a)Λ(t, x,m)(da) ≤ f(t, x,m,αΛ(t, x,m)).
In particular, if X solves the SDE
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + dWt, (4.11)
where W is a Brownian motion, µ is a continuous P(Rd)-valued process, and (X0, µ,W ) are
independent, then X also solves the SDE
dXt = b(t,Xt, µt, α
Λ(t,Xt, µ))dt+ dWt,
and we have the inequality
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, α
Λ(t,Xt, µ))dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
. (4.12)
With this construction the proof is straightforward. We first show that a weak RMFE is a
weak MFE. Let (Ω,F ,F,P,W,Λ∗,X∗, µ) be a weak RMFE. It is then easy to check using the
above facts that (Ω,F ,F,P,W, αΛ∗ ,X∗, µ) is a weak MFE. Conversely, let (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗,X∗, µ)
be a weak MFE. Define Λ∗(t, x,m) := δα∗(t,x,m). It is clear that (Ω,F ,F,P,W,Λ∗,X∗, µ) satisfies
properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 3.6. To prove (5), let Λ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→
P(A) denote any semi-Markov function, and let X solve the corresponding SDE (4.11). Combine
property (5) of the definition of weak MFE (Definition 2.5) with (4.12) to get
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t , µt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t , µ)(da)dt + g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t,X∗t , µt, α
∗(t,X∗t , µ))dt+ g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt, µt, α
Λ(t,Xt, µ))dt+ g(XT , µT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
.
This completes the proof.
5. Proof of the main limit theorem
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3.9, from which Theorem 2.7 follows (see
Section 3.3). We break this up into three major steps. First, we show tightness, which is
straightforward in the present context. Next, we identify the limiting dynamics, in the sense
that we prove that properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 3.6 hold at the limit. Lastly, we address
the optimality condition (5).
In fact, before we prove Theorem 3.9, we will carry out the bulk of the analysis is without
using the fact that the n-player controls are given as ǫn-Nash equilibria. That is, much of the
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work of characterizing the limiting behavior can and should be done independently of the Nash
property. Only at the end will we use the Nash property to produce an inequality, which is then
passed to the limit to obtain the desired optimality condition.
In the following, we work with an arbitrary sequence of controls (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) ∈ Ann. We
write Xn = (Xn,1, . . . ,Xn,n) to denote the corresponding state process in the n-player game,
which we now index by n for clarity, and which is determined as the unique in law solution of
the SDE
dXn,it = b(t,X
n,i
t , µ
n
t , α
n,i(t,Xn))dt + dW it , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ
X
n,k
t
. (5.1)
As usual, Xn,10 , . . . ,X
n,n
0 are i.i.d. with law λ.
It is convenient in the following to work with probability measures on the path space rather
the flows of probability measures on Rd. To distinguish between the two, we will reserve bold font
for the former. For m ∈ P(Cd), define for each t ∈ [0, T ] the marginal law mt =m ◦ [x 7→ xt]−1,
and note that the map
P(Cd) ∋m 7→ m := (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd))
is continuous. Given m ∈ P(Cd), we will refer to this m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] as the induced or
corresponding measure flow. To keep track of notation, we stick to the following rules:
• We use the Latin m for a deterministic measure and the Greek µ for a random measure.
• We use boldface for a measure on path space, m ∈ P(Cd), to distinguish it from a
measure flow, written as m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)).
• Starting in Section 5.4, we will encounter probability measures on the extended path
space Cd×V, with V defined in Section 5.2. We denote such measures asm ∈ P(Cd×V).
Define µn, a random element of P(Cd), by
µn =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXn,k .
In light of the previous discussion, if µn converges in law in P(Cd) to some µ, then the marginal
flow µn = (µnt )t∈[0,T ] converges in law in C([0, T ];P(Rd)) to the corresponding marginal flow
µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ].
Let C∞c (R
d) denote the set of smooth functions of compact support. We define the infini-
tesimal generator of the controlled process as follows: For ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd), define
Lϕ(t, x,m, a) := b(t, x,m, a) · ∇ϕ(x) + 1
2
∆ϕ(x), (5.2)
for (t, x,m, a) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × P(Rd)×A.
5.1. Tightness. We first prove that (µn) is tight.
Lemma 5.1. The sequence (µn) is a tight family of P(Cd)-valued random variables.
Proof. According to [56, (2.5)], it suffices to show that the sequence of mean measures (mn) ⊂
P(Cd) is tight, where we define mn for Borel sets B ⊂ Cd by
mn(B) = E[µn(B)] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
P(Xn,k ∈ B).
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Letting ‖b‖∞ denote the minimal uniform bound on |b|, note that |Lϕ| is pointwise bounded by
the constant
Cϕ := ‖b‖∞‖∇ϕ‖∞ + 1
2
‖∆ϕ‖∞.
By Itoˆ’s formula, for every ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd) the process (ϕ(Xkt ) + Cϕt)t∈[0,T ] is a submartingale. It
follows from [55, Theorem 1.4.6] that {Xn,k : n ∈ N, k = 1, . . . , n} is a tight family of Cd-valued
random variables. Hence, (mn) is tight. 
5.2. Relaxed controls. Before we proceed to identify the dynamics of limit points of (µn), we
must first discuss a convenient topological space in which to view the controls. Let V denote
the set of measures q on [0, T ]×A with first marginal equal to Lebesgue measure. Equip V with
the topology of weak convergence, and note that V is a compact metric space because A is.See
[43, Appendix A] for a summary of basic facts about this space and references.
Each q ∈ V may be identified with a measurable function [0, T ] ∋ t 7→ qt ∈ P(A), determined
uniquely (up to a.e. equality) by dtqt(da) = q(dt, da). Similarly, a measurable P(A)-valued
process (Λt)t∈[0,T ] can be identified with the random element Λ = dtΛt(da) of V. It is known
that one can construct a measurable version of the canonical process on V. More precisely,
suppose FV = (FVt )t∈[0,T ] denotes the natural filtration, where for each t ∈ [0, T ] we define FVt
as the σ-field generated by the functions V ∋ q 7→ q(B) ∈ R, for Borel sets B ⊂ [0, t]×A. Then
there exists (see [42, Lemma 3.2]) an FV -predictable process
q̂ : [0, T ]× V → P(A), such that q̂(t, q) = qt, a.e. t, ∀q ∈ V. (5.3)
In particular, the filtration generated by the process (q̂(t, ·))t∈[0,T ] is precisely FV . With this in
mind, we are free to identify P(A)-valued processes and V-valued random variables.
5.3. Projection lemmas. As a preparation for the next step of identifying the dynamics of
the limiting measure flows, we begin with two projection arguments that will be useful again in
later sections. The first is straightforward but worth summarizing, while the second hides some
delicate measurability questions which are largely outsourced to the appendix. In the following,
it is convenient to use the usual duality notation for integration:
〈m,ϕ〉 =
∫
ϕdm.
Lemma 5.2. Suppose (Yt)t∈[0,T ] is a continuous stochastic process taking values in a Polish
space E and defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P). Suppose h : E → R is continuous, and
suppose it holds almost surely that
h(Yt) = h(Y0) +
∫ t
0
asds, a.s., for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
where (at)t∈[0,T ] is some bounded measurable real-valued process. Suppose aˆ : [0, T ]×C([0, T ];E) →
R is a progressively measurable function satisfying
aˆ(t, Y ) = E[at | FYt ], a.s., for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
where FYt = σ(Ys : s ≤ t). Then
h(Yt) = h(Y0) +
∫ t
0
aˆ(s, Y )ds, for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
Proof. By continuity, we have
h(Yt) = h(Y0) +
∫ t
0
asds, a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
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Hence, it holds a.s. that for almost every t ∈ (0, T ) we have
at = lim
δ↓0
1
δ
(h(Yt)− h(Yt−δ)) .
In particular, at is FYt -measurable, and so at = E[at | FYt ] = aˆ(t, Y ), a.s., for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Complete the proof by integrating this identity and using continuity of h and Y to interchange
the order of quantifiers as needed. 
In the following lemma, we show that a solution of a certain kind of randomized Fokker-
Planck equation can be realized as the conditional law of the state process under a semi-Markov
control. Recall the notion of semi-Markov function from Definition 2.4.
Lemma 5.3. Suppose µ is a P(Cd × V)-valued random variable, and let µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ] denote
the corresponding measure flow.7 Suppose it holds with probability 1 that for every t ∈ [0, T ] and
ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd) we have
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈µ0, ϕ〉 +
∫
Cd×V
[∫ t
0
∫
A
Lϕ(s, xs, µs, a)qs(da)ds
]
µ(dx, dq). (5.4)
Then there exists a semi-Markov function Λ∗ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A) such that
the following hold:
(a) It holds with probability 1 that for every t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd) we have
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈µ0, ϕ〉+
∫ t
0
〈
µs,
∫
A
Lϕ(s, ·, µs, a)Λ∗(t, ·, µ)(da)
〉
ds.
(b) For each bounded measurable function ψ on [0, T ] × Rd × P(Rd)×A, we have
E
[∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
∫
A
ψ(t, xt, µt, a)qt(da)dtµ(dx, dq)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
ψ(t, x, µt, a)Λ
∗(t, x, µ)(da)µt(dx) dt
]
.
(c) By enlarging the probability space, we may construct continuous d-dimensional processes X
and W such that:
(i) X0, W , and µ are independent.
(ii) W is a Brownian motion with respect to the complete filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated
by the process (X0, µt,Wt)t∈[0,T ].
(iii) X is a continuous process with X0 ∼ λ, adapted to the completion of F.
(iv) The state equation holds,
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + dWt.
(v) For each t, it holds a.s. that µt = L(Xt | Fµt ), where Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t).
Proof. We first justify (c), assuming we have already found Λ∗ such that (a) and (b) hold. In
fact, the claimed processes X and W come from the observation that property (a) is simply a
randomized version of a Fokker-Planck equation. Corollary A.7 works out the details and shows
that we can construct X and W satisfying properties (i-v).
7That is, the C([0, T ];P(Rd))-valued random variable µ is defined by µt := µ ◦ [(x, q) 7→ xt]
−1, for t ∈ [0, T ].
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To construct Λ∗ satisfying (a) and (b), we note first that (5.4) rewrites as
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈µ0, ϕ〉 +
∫
Cd×V
[∫ t
0
∫
A
Lϕ(s, xs, µs, a)q̂(s, q)(da)ds
]
µ(dx, dq),
where q̂ is the “nice version” of the process [0, T ]× V ∋ (t, q) 7→ qt ∈ P(A) described in (5.3).
Suppose for concreteness that the random variable µ is defined on a probability space
(Ω,F ,P), and we may assume without loss of generality that Ω is a Polish space and F its
Borel σ-field. We now use Lemma B.2 to construct a jointly measurable version of the regular
condition law of (xt, q) given xt under the random probability measure µ(dx, dq); precisely, there
exists a jointly measurable map [0, T ]×Rd×Ω ∋ (t, x, ω) 7→ µt,x(ω) ∈ P(Cd×V) such that it holds
a.s. that for every bounded measurable function h : [0, T ]×Rd → R and F : [0, T ]×Cd×V → R
we have∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
h(t, xt)F (t, x, q)dtµ(dx, dq) =
∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
h(t, xt)〈µt,xt , F (t, ·)〉dtµ(dx, dq), a.s.
Using Fubini’s theorem and a change of variables, we may rewrite this as∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
h(t, xt)F (t, x, q)dtµ(dx, dq) =
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
h(t, x)〈µt,x, F (t, ·)〉µt(dx)dt, a.s. (5.5)
Applying this with F (t, x, q) =
∫
A
Lϕ(t, x, µt, a)q̂(t, q)(da), we may write (5.4) as
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈µ0, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
∫
Cd×V
∫
A
Lϕ(s, x, µs, a) q̂(s, q)(da)µt,x(dx˜, dq)µs(dx)ds, a.s. (5.6)
Next, recall that Fµ = (Fµt )t∈[0,T ] is the filtration generated by the process (µt)t∈[0,T ]. We
may find (using Corollary C.3) a semi-Markov function Λ∗ : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A)
such that, for every bounded measurable function ψ : [0, T ] × Rd × P(Rd) × A → R and every
(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd, we have∫
A
ψ(t, x, µt, ·) dΛ∗(t, x, µ) = E
[∫
Cd×V
∫
A
ψ(t, x, µt, a)q̂(s, q)(da)µt,x(dx˜, dq)
∣∣∣∣Fµt ] . (5.7)
Applying (5.7) with ψ = Lϕ, and using (5.6) and Lemma 5.2, we get
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈µ0, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
Lϕ(s, x, µs, a)Λ
∗(t, x, µ)(da)µs(dx)ds,
for all t ∈ [0, T ], almost surely, for each ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd). This is exactly (a), once we interchange
the order of the quantifiers “almost surely” and “for each ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd).” This is easily justified
by working with a countable dense family of such ϕ.
Finally, to prove (b), fix ψ, and simply use (5.5) and (5.7) along with Fubini’s theorem:
E
[∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
∫
A
ψ(t, xt, µt, a)qt(da)dtµ(dx, dq)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
Cd×V
∫
A
ψ(t, x, µt, a) q̂(t, q)(da)µt,x(dx˜, dq)µt(dx) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
ψ(t, x, µt, a)Λ
∗(t, x, µ)(da)µt(dx) dt
]
.

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5.4. Identification of limiting dynamics. We next provide a first description of the dynamics
of subsequential limit points of µnk = (µnkt )t∈[0,T ].
Theorem 5.4. Suppose a subsequence (µnkt )t∈[0,T ] converges in law in C([0, T ];P(Rd)) to (µt)t∈[0,T ].
Then there exists a semi-Markov function Λ∗ : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A) such that, by
extending the probability space if needed, we may construct continuous d-dimensional processes
X and W such that:
(i) X0, W , and µ are independent.
(ii) W is a Brownian motion with respect to the complete filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated
by the process (X0, µt,Wt)t∈[0,T ].
(iii) X is adapted with respect to the completion of F, with X0 ∼ λ.
(iv) The following SDE holds:
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + dWt.
(v) For each t, it holds a.s. that µt = L(Xt | Fµt ), where Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t).
Moreover,
lim
k→∞
1
nk
nk∑
i=1
Jnki (α
nk ,1, . . . , αnk,nk)
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
. (5.8)
Proof. Let us view each control as a random element of V, by defining
Λn,i(dt, da) = dtδαn,i(t,Xn)(da).
and define the extended empirical measure µn, a P(Cd × V)-valued random variable, by
µn =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(Xn,k ,Λn,k).
Because the Cd-marginal µn is tight by Lemma 5.1 and V is compact, the sequence of random
measures µn is tight. We may then pass to a further subsequence and assume that µn converges
in law to some random element µ of P(Cd × V) whose Cd-marginal is µ.
Step 1: We first show that µ must satisfy the hypothesis (5.4) of Lemma 5.3. Recall that
Xn = (Xn,1, . . . ,Xn,n) is the vector of state processes; see (5.1). Begin by applying Itoˆ’s
formula to ϕ(Xn,kt ) and averaging over k = 1, . . . , n to get
d〈µnt , ϕ〉 =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Lϕ(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , α
n,k(t,Xn))dt+ dMn,ϕt
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
∫
A
Lϕ(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , a)Λ
n,k
t (da)dt + dM
n,ϕ
t ,
where we define the martingale
Mn,ϕt =
1
n
n∑
k=1
∇ϕ(Xn,ks ) · dW ks .
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Notice that the quadratic variation of this martingale is
[Mn,ϕ]t =
1
n2
n∑
k=1
∫ t
0
|∇ϕ(Xn,ks )|2ds ≤
‖∇ϕ‖2∞
n
. (5.9)
For a measure m ∈ P(Cd × V), let m = (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) denote the associated
measure flow, and define Ft : P(Cd × V)→ R by
Fϕt (m) =
∫
Cd×V
[
ϕ(xt)− ϕ(x0)−
∫ t
0
∫
A
Lϕ(s, xs,ms, a)qs(da)ds
]
m(dx, dq).
We may then write
Mn,ϕt = F
ϕ
t (µ
n),
It can be shown that Fϕt is a bounded continuous function (see [42, Appendix A] for details).
Because µn converges in law to µ, we conclude from the continuous mapping theorem that
Fϕt (µ
n) converges in law to Fϕt (µ) (with convergence understood in both cases to be along the
same subsequence as before). But (5.9) implies that Fϕt (µ
n) = Mn,ϕt converges in probability
to zero. Hence,
Fϕt (µ) = 0, almost surely, for each t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd).
For each m ∈ P(Cd × V), it is clear that limn Fϕntn (m) = Fϕt (m) whenever tn → t and
(ϕn,∇ϕn,∆ϕn) → (ϕ,∇ϕ,∆ϕ) uniformly. Hence, working with a countable dense family, we
may interchange the order of quantifiers and conclude that
Fϕt (µ) = 0, for each t ∈ [0, T ], ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd), almost surely.
This shows that µ satisfies (5.4).
Step 2. We now construct the processes X and W . Thanks to Step 1, we may apply Lemma
5.3 to find a semi-Markov function Λ∗ : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd)) → A such that (a), (b),
and (c) of Lemma 5.3 hold.
Step 3. To complete the proof, we address the final claim about convergence of value. Notice
that
Jn :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xn,it , µ
n
t , α
n,i(t,Xn))dt+ g(XiT , µ
n
T )
]
= E
[∫
Cd×V
(∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, xt, µ
n
t , a)qt(da)dt+ g(xT , µ
n
T )
)
µn(dx, dq)
]
.
Recall that any subsequence contains a further subsequence along which µn converges to some µ.
Along such a subsequence, by boundedness and continuity of f and g, we find that Jn converges
to
E
[∫
Cd×V
(∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, xt, µt, a)qt(da)dt + g(xT , µT )
)
µ(dx, dq)
]
.
We claim that this is equal to the right-hand side of (5.8). Recalling that (µt)t∈[0,T ] is the
marginal flow associated with µ and also that µt = L(Xt | Fµt ) for each t, we may write the
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second term as
E
[∫
Cd×V
g(xT , µT )µ(dx, dq)
]
= E
[∫
Rd
g(x, µT )µT (dx)
]
= E[g(XT , µT )].
To handle the first term, we use part (b) of Lemma 5.3 along with Fubini’s theorem and the
identity µt = L(Xt | Fµt ) to write
E
[∫
Cd×V
∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, xt, µt, a)qt(da)dtµ(dx, dq)
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
f(t, x, µt, a)Λ
∗(t, x, µ)(da)µt(dx) dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da) dt
]
.
This completes the proof. 
5.5. Optimality. The analysis carried out so far will allow us to check all of the properties of
Definition 3.6 at the limit except for the optimality condition (5), and this section will complete
this last task. Using Theorem 5.4, we work with a fixed weak limit µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ], and we abuse
notation by relabeling the subsequence with the same notation, so that µn = (µnt )t∈[0,T ] → µ
weakly in C([0, T ];P(Rd)). It is crucial to keep in mind that for the rest of this section we are
working with this particlar limit point and this particular convergent subsequence.
By Theorem 5.4, we may assume that µ is defined on a complete filtered probability
space (Ω,F ,F,P), which supports d-dimensional processes X and W which satisfy properties
(i-v) of Theorem 5.4 and equation (5.8), for some semi-Markov function Λ∗ : [0, T ] × Rd ×
C([0, T ];P(Rd)) → P(A). Throughout this section, the notation (Ω,F ,F,P) of this paragraph
will stand.
Relative to this fixed random measure flow µ, we define on (Ω,F ,F,P) the family of all
possible alternative strategy choices. Let us write Rsemi for the set of semi-Markov functions
from [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd)) to P(A). For any Λ ∈ Rsemi, let X[Λ] = (Xt[Λ])t∈[0,T ] denote
the unique strong solution (see Lemmas A.2 and A.3) of the SDE8
dXt[Λ] =
∫
A
b(t,Xt[Λ], µt, a)Λ(t,Xt[Λ], µ)(da)dt + dWt, X0[Λ] = X0. (5.10)
In this notation, note that X[Λ∗] = X. Define
J(Λ) := E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt[Λ], µt, a)Λ(t,Xt[Λ], µ)(da)dt + g(XT [Λ], µT )
]
.
The proof of Theorem 3.9 will be complete if we can show that
sup
Λ∈Rsemi
J(Λ) = J(Λ∗). (5.11)
We accomplish this in two steps. The first and more straightforward step is to reduce the
supremum to a nicer subset of Rsemi. Precisely, we will show
sup
β∈Ac
semi
J(β) = sup
Λ∈Rsemi
J(Λ), (5.12)
8It is not important here that we are working with strong solutions, but it is notationally convenient to
construct everything on the same probability space (Ω,F , F,P).
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where we define Acsemi to be the set of continuous semi-Markov functions β : [0, T ] × Rd ×
C([0, T ];P(Rd)) → A, which we view as a subset of Rsemi by means of the usual embedding
A ∋ a 7→ δa ∈ P(A). Indeed, (5.12) follows from:
Lemma 5.5. For any Λ ∈ Rsemi, there exists a sequence βn ∈ Acsemi such that (µ,X[Λn])
converges in law in to (µ,X[Λ]) and J(βn)→ J(Λ).
Lastly, for each “nice” alternative control β ∈ Acsemi, we show that J(β) is the limit of the
average value of some sequence of admissible n-player controls, which is accomplished using the
following crucial proposition:
Proposition 5.6. Let β ∈ Acsemi. For each n and each k = 1, . . . , n, define βn,k ∈ An by
βn,k(t,x) = β
(
t, xkt ,
1
n
n∑
j=1
δxj
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ], x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Cd)n. (5.13)
Then (taking limits along the same subsequence described above)
lim
n
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βn,k, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n) = J(β). (5.14)
With Proposition 5.6 in hand, let us see how to complete the proof of Theorem 3.9:
Proof of Theorem 3.9. Using (5.12), for an arbitrary δ > 0 we may find β ∈ Acsemi such that
sup
Λ∈Rsemi
J(Λ) ≤ J(β) + δ.
To prove (5.11) it now suffices to show that J(β) ≤ J(Λ∗). Recall (5.8) from Theorem 5.4, which
says
J(Λ∗) = lim
n
1
n
n∑
i=1
Jni (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n),
where the limit is taken along the appropriate subsequence. On the other hand, defining βn,k as
in Proposition 5.6, we have (5.14). Finally using the fact that (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) is a closed-loop
ǫn-Nash equilibrium with ǫn → 0, we conclude that, along the same convergent subsequence,
J(β) = lim
n
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βn,k, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n)
≤ lim
n
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n) + ǫn
= J(Λ∗).
The proof of Theorem 3.9 is thus complete. 
Remark 5.7. It is clear from the proof that we do not need the full strength of the ǫn-Nash
equilibrium property. In fact, it suffices to assume merely that αn = (αn,1, . . . , αn,n) satisfies
the much weaker inequality
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,n) + ǫn ≥ sup
β1,...,βn∈An
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βk, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n).
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Proof of Lemma 5.5.
Step 1. Before constructing the approximations, we show how to derive the claimed limits.
Suppose Λn ∈ Rsemi, and assume that it holds for almost every x ∈ Rd and L(µ)-almost every
m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) that, for every bounded continuous function ϕ : [0, T ]× Rd ×A→ R,
lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
A
ϕ(t, x, a)Λn(t, x,m)(da)dxdt =
∫ T
0
∫
A
ϕ(t, x, a)Λn(t, x,m)(da)dt.
Consider the coefficients
Bn(t, x,m) :=
∫
A
b(t, x,mt, a)Λ
n(t, x,m)(da), B(t, x,m) =
∫
A
b(t, x,mt, a)Λ(t, x,m)(da).
For continuous ϕ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd with compact support, we have
lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
(
Bn(t, x,m)−B(t, x,m)
) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt = 0,
for L(µ)-almost every m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)). Using Lemma A.4, we conclude that (µ,X[Λn])
converges in law to (µ,X[Λ]). To conclude that J(Λn)→ J(Λ) we would like to simply use the
fact that f and g are bounded and continuous, but we must be careful about the fact that Λ
and Λn may be discontinuous. Begin by writing
J(Λn) = E [Fn(µ,X[Λ
n])] ,
where we define Fn : C([0, T ];P(Rd))× Cd → R by
Fn(m,x) =
∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, xt,mt, a)Λ
n(t, xt,m)(da)dt + g(xT ,mT ).
Define F (x,m) similarly, with Λ in place of Λn, so that J(Λ) = E[F (µ,X[Λ])]. We know
from Lemma A.4 that E[h(µ,X[Λn])] → E[h(µ,X[Λ])] for every bounded measurable function
h : C([0, T ];P(Rd)) × Cd → R. On the other hand, we know by assumption that Fn → F
pointwise. We may use a form of the dominated convergence theorem [54, Proposition 11.4.18]
to conclude that E [Fn(µ,X[Λ
n])]→ E[F (µ,X[Λ])].
Step 2. Next, we construct the desired approximations. Apply the well known “chattering
lemma” (see, e.g., [40, Theorem 2.2] or [28, Theorem 4]) to find a sequence of semi-Markov
functions βn : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ A such that
dtδβn(t,x,m)(da)→ dtΛ(t, x,m)(da)
weakly (i.e., in V) for each (x,m). Hence, we may assume Λ is already of the form Λ(t, x,m) =
δβ(t,x,m) for some semi-Markov function β.
To complete the proof we use the fact that, since A is compact and convex, any measurable
function from a Polish probability space into A is the a.e. limit of continuous functions (see,
e.g., [17, Proposition C.1]). By “Polish probability space” we mean a Polish space E equipped
with a Borel probability measure. The only hurdle is that the Borel σ-field of the space Θ :=
[0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is strictly larger than the one generated by semi-Markov functions,
but this is not difficult to work around. Equip Θ with the probability measure Q defined for
Borel sets S ⊂ Θ by
Q(S) =
1
T
E
[∫ T
0
∫
Rd
1S(t, x, µt)Φd(x) dx dt
]
,
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where Φd is the density of a standard d-dimensional Gaussian random variable. Define the map
Π : Θ→ Θ by
Π(t, x,m) = (t, x,m·∧t),
where m·∧t denotes the path which follows m up to time t and is constant thereafter. Then Π
is continuous, and the image Π(Θ) is closed. Moreover, the σ-field generated by Θ is precisely
the one generated by the semi-Markov functions, and so any semi-Markov function F : Θ → A
factorizes through Π, in the sense that F = F ◦ Π. The space Π(Θ) is a Polish space with the
induced topology. Hence, as mentioend above, β = β ◦Π is the Q ◦Π−1-a.e. limit of a sequence
of continuous functions β˜n : Π(Θ) → A. Define βn : Θ → A by βn = β˜n ◦ Π. Then, βn is
continuous for each n, and βn → β holds Q-a.e. 
Proof of Proposition 5.6. Recall that Xn solves the SDE (5.1). Define the state process
Y n,k = (Y n,k,1, . . . , Y n,k,n) :=Xn[(αn,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βn,k, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n)]
Note that Y n,k follows the dynamics
dY n,k,kt = b(t, Y
n,k,k
t , µ
n,k
t , β(t,Y
n,k,k
t , µ
n,k))dt+ dW kt ,
dY n,k,it = b(t, Y
n,k,i
t , µ
n,k
t , α
n,i(t,Y n,k))dt+ dW it , i 6= k,
µn,kt =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δY n,k,j .
Assume that Xn is defined on some filtered probability space (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn), and we of course
assume that the Brownian motions W k from (5.1) are in fact Fn-Brownian motions. Note Y n
may live on a different probability space which, to avoid complicating notation, we will not
give a name. Recall from the second paragraph of Section 5.5 that we are working throughout
this proof with a given (relabeled) subsequence along which L(µn) = Pn ◦ (µn)−1 converges in
P(C([0, T ];P(Rd))) to L(µ).
Step 1. It is convenient in this proof to work on a suitable canonical space, and the first step
is simply to set up notation. Define an equivalent probability measure Qn,k on (Ωn,Fn,Fn) by
setting
dQn,k
dPn
= exp
(∫ T
0
(
b(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , β(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n))− b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , αn,k(t,Xn))
)
· dW kt
− 1
2
∫ T
0
∣∣∣b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , β(t,Xn,kt , µn))− b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , αn,k(t,Xn))∣∣∣2dt
)
.
By Girsanov’s theorem and uniqueness of the SDEs, we have Qn,k ◦ (Xn)−1 = L(Y n,k), and
thus Qn,k ◦ (µn,Xn)−1 = L(µn,k,Y n,k). Note also that we may write dQn,k/dPn = ζn,kT , where
we define ζn,k as the unique solution of the SDE
dζn,kt = ζ
n,k
t Ξ
n,k
t · dW kt , ζn,k0 = 1,
Ξn,kt := b(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n
t , β(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n))− b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , αn,k(t,Xn)) (5.15)
We note for future use that boundedness of b easily yields the estimate
sup
n∈N
max
k=1,...,n
E
[∣∣∣dQn,k/dPn∣∣∣p] = sup
n∈N
max
k=1,...,n
E
[
|ζn,kT |p
]
<∞, (5.16)
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for any p > 0. Moreover, we may write
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βn,k, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n)
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
E
[∫ T
0
f(t, Y n,k,kt , µ
n,k
t , β(t, Y
n,k,k
t , µ
n,k))dt+ g(Y n,k,kT , µ
n,k
T )
]
(5.17)
=
1
n
n∑
k=1
EQ
n,k
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , β(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n))dt+ g(Xn,kT , µ
n
T )
]
= EP
n
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
ζn,kT
(∫ T
0
f(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , β(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n))dt+ g(Xn,kT , µ
n
T )
)]
. (5.18)
We would like to show that the measure 1
n
∑n
k=1L(Y n,k,k, µn,k) converges to L(X[β], µ), along
the same subsequence for which L(µn) converges to L(µ). Indeed, we could then pass to the
limit directly in (5.17). The change of measure allows us to transform the expression into one
involving the original µn and the particles Xn,k, as well as the new auxiliary particles ζn,k. We
will ultimately analyze the limiting behavior of the empirical measure of (Xn,k, ζn,k,W k)nk=1, as
it is convenient to include the Brownian motion W k as well.
Precisely, we proceed as follows. Define the P(A)-valued processes Λn,kt = δαn,k(t,Xn), and
view Λn,k as a V-valued random variable. Consider the extended empirical measure
Rn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ(Xn,k ,ζn,k,W k,Λn,k),
viewed as a random variable with values in P(Ω), where Ω := Cd × C1+ × Cd × V. Here, C1+ :=
C([0, T ];R+) is the space of nonnegative one-dimensional continuous paths.
Step 2. We first show that the sequence {Pn ◦ (Rn)−1 : n ∈ N} ⊂ P(P(Ω)) is tight. According
to [56, (2.5)], it suffices to show that the sequence {Mn : n ∈ N} ⊂ P(Ω) of mean measures is
tight, where the mean measure Mn is defined on Borel sets S ⊂ Ω by
Mn(S) = E
Pn [Rn(S)] =
1
n
n∑
k=1
Pn
(
(Xn,k, ζn,k,W k,Λn,k) ∈ S). (5.19)
To do this, it suffices to show that each marginal sequence is tight. Since V is compact, the
V-marginal sequence is clearly tight. The third marginal ofMn is precisely Wiener measure; this
sequence is constant and therefore tight. We saw in the proof of Lemma 5.1 that the sequence
of first marginals
1
n
n∑
k=1
Pn ◦ (Xn,k)−1
is tight. Finally, we must check that the second marginal sequence
1
n
n∑
k=1
Pn ◦ (ζn,k)−1
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is tight. This is accomplished using Aldous’ criterion for tightness [37, Lemma 16.12]. First,
note that the estimate (5.16) implies by Doob’s inequality
sup
n∈N
max
k=1,...,n
EP
n
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|ζn,kt |p
]
<∞, (5.20)
Recalling that b is uniformly bounded, we have |Ξn,k| ≤ 2‖b‖∞, where we recall the notation
Ξn,k from (5.15). For any δ > 0 and any [0, T − δ]-valued stopping time, Itoˆ’s isometry yields
EP
n
[
|ζn,kτ+δ − ζn,kτ |2
]
= EP
n
[∣∣∣∣∫ τ+δ
τ
ζn,kt Ξ
n,k
t · dW kt
∣∣∣∣2
]
= EP
n
[∫ τ+δ
τ
|ζkt |2|Ξn,kt |2dt
]
≤ 4δ‖b‖2∞EP
n
[
sup
t∈[0,T ]
|ζkt |2
]
.
This converges to zero as δ → 0, uniformly in n, k, and τ . This is enough to apply Aldous’
criterion and conclude that the second marginal sequence of Mn is tight, thus completing the
proof that Rn is a tight sequence of P(Ω)-valued random variables.
Step 3. As a first step toward identifying the limit points of Rn, by first showing that all limit
points are supported on the set of solutions of a certain martingale problem. For the moment,
fix n ∈ N and k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. For any ϕ = ϕ(x, y, w) ∈ C∞c (Rd ×R+ ×Rd), Itoˆ’s formula yields
dϕ(Xn,kt , ζ
n,k
t ,W
k
t ) = ∇xϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt ) · b(t,Xn,kt , µnt , αn,k(s,Xn))dt+
1
2
∆xϕ(X
n,k
t , ζ
n,k
t ,W
k
t )dt
+
1
2
∂yyϕ(X
n,k
t , ζ
n,k
t ,W
k
t )|ζn,kt |2|Ξn,kt |2dt+
1
2
∆wϕ(X
n,k
t , ζ
n,k
t ,W
k
t )dt
+ ζn,kt (∇x +∇w)∂yϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt ) · Ξn,kt dt
+ (∇w · ∇x)ϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt )dt+ ∂yϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt )ζn,kt Ξn,kt · dW kt
+∇xϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt ) · dW kt +∇wϕ(Xn,kt , ζn,kt ,W kt ) · dW kt
Here we write (∇w · ∇x) for the operator
∑d
i=1 ∂wi∂xi . For m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)), t ∈ [0, T ], and
ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd × R+ × Rd), define a random variable Mt[m,ϕ] : Ω→ R by
Mt[m,ϕ](x, y, w, q) = ϕ(xt, yt, wt)−
∫ t
0
∫
A
M̂ [m,ϕ](u, xu, yu, wu, a)qu(da)du,
where, for (t, x, y, w, a) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × R+ × Rd ×A, we define
M̂ [m,ϕ](t, x, y, w, a) = ∇xϕ(x, y, w) · b(t, x,mt, a) + 1
2
∆xϕ(x, y, w)
+
1
2
∂yyϕ(x, y, w)|y|2 |b(t, x,mt, β(t, x,m)) − b(t, x,mt, a)|2
+ y(∇x +∇w)∂yϕ(x, y, w) · [b(t, x,mt, β(t, x,m)) − b(t, x,mt, a)]
+
1
2
∆wϕ(x, y, w) + (∇w · ∇x)ϕ(x, y, w).
Under Pn, the above calculation shows that the process
Mn,k,ϕt :=Mt[µ
n, ϕ](Xn,k, ζn,k,W k,Λn,k)
is a martingale. Moreover, the cross-variation [Mn,k,ϕ,Mn,j,ϕ] vanishes for j 6= k.
To completely specify a martingale problem, we equip Ω with a canonical filtration F =
(F t)t∈[0,T ]. Precisely, this is defined by letting F t be the σ-field generated by the maps Ω ∋
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(x, y, w, q) 7→ (xs, ys, ws, q̂(s, ·)) ∈ Rd ×R+ ×Rd ×P(A), for s ≤ t, where q̂ is the version of the
canonical P(A)-valued process on V described in (5.3).
For s < t and any continuous Fs-measurable function h : Ω→ R bounded in absolute value
by 1, define F [h, ϕ, s, t] : P(Ω)→ R by
F [h, ϕ, s, t](R) = |〈R, (Mt[Rx, ϕ]−Ms[Rx, ϕ])h〉|2,
where, for R ∈ P(Ω) = P(Cd × C1+ × Cd × V), we write Rx to denote the induced measure
flow Rx = (Rxt )t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) induced by the first Cd-marginal of R. That is, Rxt =
R ◦ [(x, y, w, q) 7→ xt]−1. Because b and β are continuous by assumption, the map
C([0, T ];P(Rd))× Ω ∋ (m,x, y, w, q) 7→
∫ t
0
∫
A
M̂ [m,ϕ](u, xu, yu, wu, a)qu(da)du
is continuous for each t and ϕ (see, e.g., [42, Appendix A] for details). We would immedi-
ately deduce that F [h, ϕ, s, t] is continuous on P(Ω), except that M̂ is unbounded due to the
multiplication by |y|2. To deal with this, abbreviate F = F [h, ϕ, s, t], and define for r > 0
F r[h, ϕ, s, t](R) = |〈R, (M rt [Rx, ϕ]−M rs [Rx, ϕ])h〉|2,
where M rt [m,ϕ](x, y, w, q) := Mt[m,ϕ](x, y ∧ r, w, q). Then M r[m,ϕ] is uniformly bounded for
each r and ϕ. Using (5.20), it is straightforward to check that
lim
r→∞ supn∈N
EP
n [|F [h, ϕ, s, t](Rn)− F r[h, ϕ, s, t](Rn)|2] = 0. (5.21)
Note that F r[h, ϕ, s, t] is bounded and continuous on P(Ω).
Now, recalling that the sequence Rn is tight by Step 2, we may suppose that it converges
in law (along a subsequence) to some P(Ω)-valued random variable R. Use (5.21) to conclude
that Pn ◦ (F [h, ϕ, s, t](Rn))−1 converges to L(F [h, ϕ, s, t](R)). Then, using Fatou’s lemma, the
fact that Mn,k,ϕ and Mn,j,ϕ define orthogonal martingales, and |h| ≤ 1, we find (taking limits
along the same subsequence)
E [F [h, ϕ, s, t](R)] ≤ lim inf
n
EP
n
[F [h, ϕ, s, t](Rn)]
= lim inf
n
EP
n
∣∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
k=1
(Mn,k,ϕt −Mn,k,ϕs )h(Xn,k, ζn,k,W k,Λn,k)
∣∣∣∣∣
2

= lim inf
n
1
n2
n∑
k=1
EP
n
[∣∣∣Mn,k,ϕt −Mn,k,ϕs ∣∣∣2 h2(Xn,k, ζn,k,W k,Λn,k)]
≤ lim inf
n
1
n2
n∑
k=1
EP
n
[∣∣∣Mn,k,ϕt −Mn,k,ϕs ∣∣∣2] .
Finally, noting that
EP
n
[∣∣∣Mn,k,ϕt −Mn,k,ϕs ∣∣∣2]
= EP
n
∫ t
s
∣∣∣(∇w +∇x)ϕ(Xn,ku , ζn,ku ,W ku ) + ∂yϕ(Xn,ku , ζn,ku ,W ku )ζn,ku Ξku∣∣∣2 du,
we use (5.20) and boundedness of b to get
sup
n∈N
max
k=1,...,n
EP
n
[∣∣∣Mn,k,ϕt −Mn,k,ϕs ∣∣∣2] <∞.
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Hence,
E [F [h, ϕ, s, t](R)] = 0.
In particular, F [h, ϕ, s, t](R) = 0 a.s. for each h, ϕ, s, t.
By working with a countably dense family (as in the end of Step 1 of the proof of Theorem
5.4), we may switch the order of quantifiers to conclude that it holds with probability 1 that,
for all (h, ϕ, s, t), F [h, ϕ, s, t](R) = 0. Recalling the definition of F [h, ϕ, s, t], this means that R
is supported on the set L ⊂ P(Ω) consisting of those probability measures R such that:
• (Mt[Rx, ϕ])t∈[0,T ] is an R-martingale, for each ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd × R+ × Rd), where Rx =
(Rxt )t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) denotes the measure flow associated with the first marginal.
• R ◦ [(x, y, w, q) 7→ (x0, y0, w0)]−1 = λ× δ1 × δ0.
Step 4. We now establish a key identity satisfied by the measures R ∈ L identified in the
previous step. For m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) let Pm ∈ P(Cd) denote the law of the unique solution
Xm of the SDE
dXmt = b(t,X
m
t ,mt, β(t,X
m
t ,m))dt+ dBt, X
m
0 ∼ λ.
This defines a universally measurable map C([0, T ];P(Rd)) ∋ m 7→ Pm ∈ P(Cd), by Lemma
A.1. We claim that every R ∈ L satisfies∫
Ω
h(x)yT R(dx, dy, dw, dq) = 〈PRx , h〉, (5.22)
for bounded measurable functions h on Cd.
Fix R ∈ L. We can construct, on some filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), an Ω-valued
random variable (X, ζ,W,Λ) with law R such that the process
ϕ(Xt, ζt,Wt)−
∫ t
0
∫
A
[
∇xϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws) · b(s,Xs, Rxs , a) +
1
2
∆xϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws)
+
1
2
∂yyϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws)|y|2 |b(s,Xs, Rxs , β(s,Xs, Rx))− b(s,Xs, Rxs , a)|2
+ y(∇x +∇w)∂yϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws) · [b(t,Xs, Rxs , β(s,Xs, Rx))− b(s,Xs, Rxs , a)]
+
1
2
∆wϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws) + (∇w · ∇x)ϕ(Xs, ζs,Ws)
]
Λs(da)ds
is a martingale for each ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd×R+×Rd). This is a bit different from the usual martingale
problem framework because of the integration with respect to Λs(da), so standard theory does
not immediately tell us how to represent (X, ζ,W ) as the solution of an SDE. But the work
of El Karoui and Me´le´ard [38] covers this situation by making use of the notion of martingale
measures, in the sense of Walsh [61], and the reader is referred to either reference for precise
definitions. According to [38, Theorem IV-2], by extending the probability space if needed, we
may find a vector M = (M1, . . . ,Md) of orthogonal martingale measures M i = M i(da, dt) on
A× [0, T ], each with intensity measure Λt(da)dt, such that the following hold, for t ∈ [0, T ]:
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, R
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt + dWt
dWt =
∫
A
M(da, dt), i.e., Wt =
∫
A×[0,t]
M(da, ds) =M(A× [0, t]),
dζt = ζtdNt,
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where we define the martingale N by
Nt =
∫
A×[0,t]
(
b(s,Xs, R
x
s , β(s,Xs, R
x))− b(s,Xs, Rxs , a)
) ·M(da, ds).
The only fact we need to know about martingale measures in the following: For any bounded
jointly functions ϕ,ψ : [0, T ]×A×Ω→ Rd (using the Borel σ-field on A and the F-progressive σ-
field on [0, T ]×Ω), the processes t 7→ ∫
A×[0,t] ϕ(s, a)·M(da, ds) and t 7→
∫
A×[0,t] ψ(s, a)·M(da, ds)
are orthogonal martingales with covariation process
∫ t
0
∫
A
ϕ(s, a) ·ψ(s, a)Λs(da)ds. In particular,
using this and Le´vy’s characterization, we deduce that W is a Brownian motion.
Continuing to work on the same probability space (Ω,F ,F,P), define a change of measure
by
dQ
dP
:= ζT = exp(NT − 12 [N ]T ).
By Girsanov’s theorem (e.g., in the general form of [52, Theorem III.39]), the process B =
W − [W,N ] is a Q-Brownian motion, and we compute
Bt =Wt −
∫ t
0
∫
A
(
b(s,Xs, R
x
s , β(s,Xs, R
x))− b(s,Xs, Rxs , a)
)
Λs(da)ds.
Substitute this into the equation for X to get
dXt = b(t,Xt, R
x
t , β(t,Xt, R
x))dt+ dBt, (5.23)
still with initial distribution Q ◦X−10 = P ◦X−10 = λ.
The SDE (5.23) has a unique in law solution, and its law is precisely Q ◦X−1 = PRx , where
Pm was defined for m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) at the beginning of this step. It then holds, for any
bounded measurable h : Cd → R, that∫
Ω
h(x)yT R(dx, dy, dw, dq) = E
P[h(X)ζT ] = E
Q[h(X)] = 〈PRx , h〉,
which establishes (5.22).
Step 5. We are finally ready to take limits. Recalling from Step 2 that Rn is a tight sequence,
let R denote any weak limit. From Step 3 we know that R belongs almost surely to L. Recalling
the identifications of Step 1, we may pass to the limit along the same subsequence along which
Rn converges in law to R to get, using (5.22),
lim
1
n
n∑
k=1
EP
n
[ζn,kT h(µ
n,Xn,k)] = limEP
n
[∫
Ω
yTh(µ
n, x)Rn(dx, dy, dw, dq)
]
= E
[∫
Ω
yTh(R
x, x)R(dx, dy, dw, dq)
]
= E
[〈PRx , h(Rx, ·)〉] ,
for any bounded continuous function h on C([0, T ];P(Rd)) × Cd. Recall that µn converges in
law to µ, which implies that Rx
d
= µ. Hence,
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
EP
n
[ζn,kT h(µ
n,Xn,k)] = E [〈Pµ, h(µ, ·)〉] ,
Recalling the notation from before the statement the Proposition, the process X[β] solves the
SDE
dXt[β] = b(t,Xt[β], µt, β(t,Xt[β], µ))dt + dWt,
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where X0 ∼ λ, W , and µ are independent. Lemma A.2 ensures that the conditional law of X[β]
given µ is precisely Pµ. In particular, E [〈Pµ, h(µ, ·)〉] = E [h(µ,X[β])], and we have
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
k=1
EP
n
[ζn,kT h(µ
n,Xn,k)] = E [h(µ,X[β])] .
Finally, recalling that f , g, and β are continuous by assumption, we may finally return to (5.18)
from Step 1 to complete the proof:
1
n
n∑
k=1
Jnk (α
n,1, . . . , αn,k−1, βn,k, αn,k+1, . . . , αn,n)
= EP
n
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
ζn,kT
(∫ T
0
f(t,Xn,kt , µ
n
t , β(t,X
n,k
t , µ
n))dt+ g(Xn,kT , µ
n
T )
)]
= E
[∫ T
0
f(t,Xt[β], µt, β(t,Xt[β], µ))dt + g(XT [β], µT )
]
= J(β).

6. Closed-loop versus open-loop
This section compares our notion of weak semi-Markov RMFE (Definition 3.6) with the
notion of weak MFG solution of [43, Definition 3.1], which itself is a specialization of [17, Def-
inition 3.1] to the case without common noise. The relevance of the latter definition is that
it characterizes the limits of n-player approximate equilibria in open-loop regime [43, Theorem
3.4]. Our goal is to show that these two definitions are largely equivalent. To state the definition
of a weak MFG solution, we first need a bit of notation.
Recall from Section 5.2 the definition of the space V of relaxed controls. Define X := Cd×V×
Cd, and equip this space with the filtration FX = (FXt )t∈[0,T ], where FXt is the σ-field generated
by the maps X ∋ (w, q, x) 7→ (ws, q(S), xs) ∈ Rd×R×Rd, where s ≤ t and S is a Borel subset of
[0, t]×A. As usual, we identify a P(A)-valued process Λ = (Λt)t∈[0,T ] with the random element
of V given by dtΛt(da). For a measure m˜ ∈ P(X ), we write m˜x = (m˜xt )t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd))
for the measure flow associated with the third marginal, i.e., m˜xt = m˜ ◦ [(w, q, x) 7→ xt]−1.
Definition 6.1. A weak MFG solution is a tuple (Ω,F ,F,P,W, µ˜,Λ,X), where:
(1) (Ω,F ,F,P) is a complete filtered probability space. Also, W is an F-Brownian motion
of dimension d, X is an F-adapted d-dimensional process with P ◦ X−10 = λ, and Λ is
a P(A)-valued F-progressively measurable process. Lastly, µ˜ is a P(X )-valued random
variable such that µ˜(S) is Ft-measurable whenever S ∈ FXt and t ∈ [0, T ].
(2) µ˜, X0, and W are independent.
(3) The state equation holds,
dXt =
∫
A
b(t,Xt, µ˜
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt + dWt.
(4) The control Λ is compatible, in the sense that σ(Λs : s ≤ t) is conditionally independent
of FX0,W,µ˜T given FX0,W,µ˜t , for each t ∈ [0, T ], where
FX0,W,µ˜t := σ(X0,Ws, µ˜(S) : s ≤ t, S ∈ FXt ).
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(5) The control Λ is optimal, in the sense that if (Ω′,F ′,F′,P′,W ′, µ˜′,Λ′,X ′) satisfies (1-4)
and P′ ◦ (µ˜′)−1 = P ◦ µ˜−1, then we have
EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µ˜
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt+ g(XT , µ˜
x
T )
]
≥ EP′
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µ˜
′x
t , a)Λ
′
t(da)dt + g(X
′
T , µ˜
′x
T )
]
.
(6) The consistency condition holds: µ˜ = P((W,Λ,X) ∈ · | µ˜) a.s.
We may abuse notation somewhat by referring to µ˜ itself as a weak MFG solution. This is
reasonable because we can recover the full joint law of (µ˜,W,Λ,X) from that of µ˜ by using the
consistency condition (6).
Theorem 6.2. Suppose (Ω,F ,F,P,W,Λ∗,X, µ) is a weak semi-Markov RMFE. Let Λt = Λ∗(t,Xt, µ),
and set µ˜ = P((W,Λ,X) ∈ · |µ). Then (Ω,F ,F,P,W, µ˜,Λ,X) is a weak MFG solution.
Proof. First, define Fµ˜ = (F µ˜t )t∈[0,T ] as the filtration generated by µ˜, namely, F µ˜t = σ(µ˜(S) :
S ∈ FXt ). As usual, let Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t). We claim first that F µ˜t = Fµt for each t. Recall
from Remark 3.8 that L(Xt |µ) = L(Xt | Fµt ) = µt a.s. for each t. It follows immediately that
Fµt ⊂ F µ˜t , because
µt = P(Xt ∈ · |µ) = µ˜xt , a.s.
For the reverse, fix a bounded FXt -measurable function h : X → R. Note that X is necessarily
FX0,W,µ-adapted by Lemma A.2, and thus so is Λ, where FX0,W,µ = (FX0,W,µt )t∈[0,T ] is defined
by FX0,W,µt = σ(X0,Ws, µs : s ≤ t). Hence, we may find a bounded FX0,W,µt -measurable random
variable ψ(X0,W, µ) such that h(W,Λ,X) = ψ(X0,W, µ) a.s. Then,
〈µ˜, h〉 = E[h(W,Λ,X) |µ] = E[ψ(X0,W, µ) |µ]
= 〈λ×W, ψ(·, ·, µ)〉,
where W denotes Wiener measure on Cd, and the last identity follows from the independence
of X0, W , and µ. Because ψ(X0,W, µ) is FX0,W,µt -measurable, this shows that 〈µ˜, h〉 is Fµt -
measurable. Hence, Fµt ⊃ F µ˜t .
Properties (1-3) and (6) of Definition 6.1 are straightforward to check now that we have
shown F µ˜t = Fµt for each t. The compatibility property (4) follows easily from the fact that Λ
is FX0,W,µ = FX0,W,µ˜-adapted.
It remains to check property the optimality property (5). According to [17, Lemma 3.11]
(see also [43, Lemma 4.7]), it suffices to check (5) only for alternative controls Λ′ which are
adapted to the filtration FX0,W,µ˜, because such controls are dense in a joint distributional sense.
Precisely, (5) is equivalent to the following:
(5’) For each FX0,W,µ˜-progressively measurable P(A)-valued process Λ′ = (Λ′t)t∈[0,T ], we have
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µ˜
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt + g(XT , µ˜
x
T )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µ˜
x
t , a)Λ
′
t(da)dt+ g(X
′
T , µ˜
x
T )
]
, (6.1)
where X ′ is the unique strong solution of the SDE
dX ′t =
∫
A
b(t,X ′t, µ˜
x
t , a)Λ
′
t(da)dt + dWt, X
′
0 = X0.
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Let (X ′,Λ′) be as in (5’). Recall that µt = µ˜xt for all t ∈ [0, T ], and so (6.1) is equivalent to
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
≥ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ
′
t(da)dt + g(X
′
T , µT )
]
. (6.2)
We showed also that Fµt = F µ˜t for each t ∈ [0, T ], and thus FX0,W,µ˜t = FX0,W,µt := σ(X0,Ws, µs :
s ≤ t). Then Λ′ is FX0,W,µ-progressively measurable, and we may write Λ′t = Λ′(t,X0,W, µ).
Because µ is a weak RMFE, we know that Λ∗ is optimal when compared to alternative
semi-Markov controls. To check that it is optimal over FX0,W,µ˜ controls, we proceed by a
projection argument reminiscent of those of Section 4. For m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)), let Pm =
P(· |µ = m) denote a version of the regular conditional law given µ. The statements in the rest
of this paragraph hold for P ◦ µ−1-almost every m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)). Since X0, W , and µ are
independent, we have Pm ◦ (X0,W )−1 = P ◦ (X0,W )−1 = λ × W, where W denotes Wiener
measure. Moreover, under Pm, the SDE still holds, which we may write as
dX ′t =
∫
A
b(t,X ′t,mt, a)Λ
′(t,X0,W,m)(da)dt + dWt.
We wish to apply Theorem 2.14 under this measure Pm. To do so, we first find a Borel measurable
function Λ̂ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A) such that
Λ̂(t,X ′t,m) = E
Pm[Λ′(t,X0,W,m) |X ′t], Pm − a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (6.3)
where these expectations are in the sense of mean measure; see Lemma C.2. The point of this
definition is that the unique strong solution Xm (on (Ω,F ,F,P)) of the SDE
dXmt =
∫
A
b(t,Xmt ,mt, a)Λ̂(t,X
m
t ,m)(da)dt + dWt, X
m
0 = X0,
satisfies P ◦ (Xmt )−1 = Pm ◦ (X ′t)−1 for each t ∈ [0, T ], by Theorem 2.14.
At this point we would like to re-introduce the random measure flow by replacing m by µ
and treating Λ̂(t,X ′t, µ) as a semi-Markov control. For this to work, we must check that Λ̂ is
not merely Borel measurable but rather semi-Markov. Note that X ′ is a strong solution, so it
is FX0,W,µ-adapted, and we can write X ′t = X
′(t,X0,W, µ). We may then write (6.3) as
Λ̂(t,X ′t,m) = E
Pm[Λ′(t,X0,W,m) |X ′(t,X0,W,m)].
Recall that Pm ◦ (X0,W )−1 = λ × W and that Λ′ and X ′ are progressive, which implies in
particular that Λ′(t,X0,W,m) = Λ′(t,X0,W, m˜) and X ′(t,X0,W,m) = X ′(t,X0,W, m˜) a.s.,
whenever t ∈ [0, T ] and ms = m˜s for s ∈ [0, t]. From these facts we deduce that Λ̂(t,X ′t,m) =
Λ̂(t,X ′t, m˜) a.s., whenever ms = m˜s for s ∈ [0, t].
Finally, returning to the unconditional measure P, define X̂ to be the unique strong solution
(on (Ω,F ,F,P)) of the SDE
dX̂t =
∫
A
b(t, X̂t, µt, a)Λ̂(t, X̂t, µ)(da)dt + dWt, X̂0 = X0, (6.4)
and note that X̂ is adapted to FX0,W,µ. Indeed, see Lemma A.2 and A.3 for well-posedness of
this SDE, despite the fact that Λ̂ may be discontinuous. In addition, as we check carefully in
the same two lemmas, the conditional law of X̂ given µ is precisely P ◦ (Xm)−1. In particular,
we find
Pm ◦ X̂−1t = P ◦ (Xmt )−1 = Pm ◦ (X ′t)−1,
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for almost every m and for each t. Equivalently, plugging in the random µ, we have Pµ =
Pµ ◦ (X ′t)−1 a.s. for each t. Using this and the definition of Λ̂, we finally use Fubini’s theorem
and the tower property of conditional expectation to get
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ
′
t(da)dt+ g(X
′
T , µT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ
′(t,W, µ)(da)dt + g(X ′T , µT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ̂(t,X
′
t, µ)(da)dt + g(X
′
T , µT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, X̂t, µt, a)Λ̂(t, X̂t, µ)(da)dt + g(X̂T , µT )
]
.
Recalling the form of the SDE (6.4) for X̂ , we may finally use the defining property (5) of a
weak RMFE (Definition 3.6) to conclude that this expectation is dominated by
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µt, a)Λ
∗(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(XT , µT )
]
,
which proves (6.2). 
Theorem 6.3. Suppose µ˜ is a weak MFG solution. Then there exists a weak semi-Markov
RMFE µ such that µ
d
= µ˜x.
Proof. Let (Ω,F ,F,P,W, µ˜,Λ,X) be a weak MFG solution. Recalling that µ˜ is a random
measure on X = Cd × V × Cd, let µ denote the image under under the map Cd × V × Cd ∋
(w, q, x) 7→ (x, q) ∈ Cd × V. It is straightforward to check using the properties of Definition 6.1
and Itoˆ’s formula that µ satisfies the identity (5.4). Hence Lemma 5.3 applies, in particular part
(c), and (enlarging the probability space if necessary) we may define Λ∗ and X∗ as therein. It
is immediate from Lemma 5.3 to check that properties (1-4) and (6) of Definition 3.6 are valid.
It remains to check the optimality property (5).
First, from part (b) of Lemma 5.3, note that
EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xt, µ˜
x
t , a)Λt(da)dt+ g(XT , µ˜
x
T )
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t , µt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t , µ)(da)dt+ g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
. (6.5)
Fix any semi-Markov function Λ′ : [0, T ]×Rd×C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ P(A), and let X ′ denote the
unique strong solution (see Lemmas A.2 and A.3) of the SDE
dX ′t =
∫
A
b(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ
′(t,X ′t, µ)(da)dt + dWt, X0 ∼ λ.
Note that X ′ is adapted to the complete filtration generated by the process (X0,Wt, µt)t∈[0,T ].
Define the P(A)-valued process Λ˜t = Λ′(t,X ′t, µ). One checks easily that (Ω,F ,F,P,W, µ˜, Λ˜,X ′)
satisfies properties (1-4) of Definition 6.1. Hence, using property (5) therein along with (6.5),
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we find
EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t , µt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t , µ)(da)dt + g(X
∗
T , µT )
]
≥ EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µ˜
x
t , a)Λ˜t(da)dt+ g(X
′
T , µ˜
x
T )
]
= EP
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X ′t, µt, a)Λ
′(t,Xt, µ)(da)dt + g(X ′T , µT )
]
.
This is valid for any choice of Λ′, and we conclude that property (5) of Definition 3.6 holds. 
We can now give a very concise proofs of Theorem 2.12 and Theorem 2.8, taking advantage of
the two theorems above. A direct and more illuminating proof of the latter is certainly possible,
but the paper is already rather long.
6.1. Proof of Theorem 2.8. By [17, Theorem 6.2], the assumptions of Theorem 2.8 ensure
uniqueness in law for weak MFG solutions in the sense of Definition 6.1. Because of Theorem
6.2, this gives uniqueness in law for weak RMFE in the sense of Definition 3.6, and in particular
uniqueness in law for weak MFE in the sense of Definition 2.5. 
6.2. Proof of Theorem 2.12. It was shown in [43, Theorem 3.4] that both claims are true if
“weak MFE” is replaced by “weak MFG solution” in the statements. We saw in Theorem 6.3
that a weak MFG solution is a weak RMFE and in Proposition 3.7 that a weak RMFE is a weak
MFE under Assumptions A and B. 
7. Constructing n-player equilibria from mean field equilibria
This section continues the discussion of Section 2.4 on the question of which weak MFE can
arise as the limit of n-player (approximate) Nash equilibria. We begin in Section 7.1 by proving
Theorem 3.10, which states that every strong RMFE arises as the limit of n-player approximate
equilibria.
The rest of the section is devoted to examples: We warm up in Section 7.2 with some
observations on the case where the game-theoretic aspect of the problem degenerates in the
sense that A is a singleton. In this uncontrolled regime, we are simply left with the study of
McKean-Vlasov limits, which already reveals of some of the range of possible behaviors.
However, much richer behavior is possible when the game-theoretic aspect does not trivialize.
Section 7.3 discusses such an example, in which there exist weak MFE which are not mixtures
of strong MFE.
7.1. Proof of Theorem 3.10. Let (m,Λ∗) be a strong RMFE, in the sense of Definition 3.5.
Let X∗ denote the corresponding state process,
dX∗t =
∫
A
b(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt+ dWt, X
∗
0 ∼ λ. (7.1)
Now, for the n-player game, define Λn,i ∈ RMn by setting
Λn,i(t,x) = Λ∗(t, xi), for x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ (Rd)n.
Define
ǫn := sup
β∈RMn
Jn1 (β,Λ
n,2, . . . ,Λn,n)− Jn1 (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n).
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Note that ǫn ≥ 0, and by symmetry it holds for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
ǫn = sup
β∈RMn
Jni (Λ
n,1, . . . ,Λn,i−1, β,Λn,i+1, . . . ,Λn,n)− Jni (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n).
Hence, Λn = (Λn,1, . . . ,Λn,n) is an ǫn-Nash equilibrium. Assumption C lets us apply the result
of [44, Theorem 2.5(2)] (or more specifically Remark 2.7 therein), a strong form of propagation
of chaos, to conclude that µn → m in law in C([0, T ];P(Rd)). Moreover, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and
any bounded measurable (not necessarily continuous) function ϕ : Rd → R, we have∫
Rd
ϕdµnt [Λ
n]→
∫
Rd
ϕdmt, (7.2)
in probability.
It remains to show that ǫn → 0. Fix arbitrarily a sequence βn ∈ RMn such that
Jn1 (β
n,Λn,2, . . . ,Λn,n) ≥ sup
β∈RMn
Jn1 (β,Λ
n,2, . . . ,Λn,n)− 1
n
. (7.3)
Abbreviate Xn = (Xn,1, . . . ,Xn,n) =X[Λn] and µn = µn[Λn], as well as
Y n = (Y n,1, . . . , Y n,n) =X[(βn,Λn,2, . . . ,Λn,n)],
νn = µn[(βn,Λn,2, . . . ,Λn,n)].
In particular, the state process Xn follows the SDEs
dXn,it =
∫
A
b(t,Xn,it , µ
n
t , a)Λ
∗(t,Xn,it )(da)dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δ
X
n,k
t
,
whereas Y n follows the SDEs
dY n,1t =
∫
A
b(t, Y n,1t , ν
n
t , a)β
n(t,Y n)(da)dt+ dW 1t ,
dY n,kt =
∫
A
b(t, Y n,kt , ν
n
t , a)Λ
∗(t, Y n,kt )(da)dt+ dW
k
t , i 6= 1,
νnt =
1
n
n∑
j=1
δ
Y
n,j
t
,
Suppose that Xn is defined on a filtered probability space (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn), where W k are
of course assumed to be Fn-Brownian motions. (We will avoid giving a name to whatever
probability space Y n is defined on, which may be different.) Define a probability measure Qn
on (Ωn,Fn,Fn) by
dQn
dPn
= exp
(∫ T
0
∫
A
b(t,Xn,1t , µ
n
t , a)(β
n(t,Xn)− Λ∗(t,Xn,1t ))(da)dW 1t
− 1
2
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣∫
A
b(t,Xn,1t , µ
n
t , a)(β
n(t,Xn)− Λ∗(t,Xn,1t ))(da)
∣∣∣∣2 dt
)
,
By Girsanov’s theorem and uniqueness of the SDEs, we have Qn ◦ (Xn)−1 = L(Y n). Bounded-
ness of b implies that
sup
n∈N
EP
n
[∣∣∣∣dQndPn
∣∣∣∣p] <∞,
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for all p ≥ 1. Hence, because µn converges in probability to m under Pn (in the sense that
limn→∞ Pn(µn /∈ U) = 0 for any open neighborhood U ofm in C([0, T ];P(Rd))), it also converges
in probability to m under Qn. But Qn ◦ (µn)−1 = L(νn), and so νn → m in probability.9
Now, view (Y n,1, βn(·,Y n),W 1) as a random element of Cd × V × Cd, where the space V of
relaxed controls was defined in Section 5.2. Recalling that V is compact, it is straightforward
to check that this sequence is tight. Letting (Y, β,W ) denote any subsequential limit point, one
readily checks using continuity of b that W is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration
(σ(Ys, βs,Ws : s ≤ t))t∈[0,T ], that Y0 ∼ λ, and that the SDE holds,
dYt =
∫
A
b(t, Yt,mt, a)βt(da)dt+ dWt.
Use Lemma C.2 to find a measurable function Λ : [0, T ]× Rd → P(A) such that
Λ(t, Yt) = E[βt |Yt], a.s., a.e. t,
in the sense of mean measures. Apply Theorem 2.14 to find that Yt
d
= Zt for all t ∈ [0, T ], where
Z is the unique strong solution of the SDE
dZt =
∫
A
b(t, Zt,mt, a)Λ(t, Zt)(da)dt + dWt.
Using the assumption that f and g are bounded and continuous, we conclude that, along the
same convergent subsequence for which (Y n,1, βn(·,Y n),W 1) converges to (Y, β,W ), we have
lim
n
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y n,1t , ν
n
t , a)β
n(t,Y n)(da)dt+ g(Y n,1T , ν
n
T )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Yt,mt, a)βt(da)dt+ g(YT ,mT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Yt,mt, a)Λ(t, Yt)(da)dt + g(YT ,mT )
]
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Zt,mt, a)Λ(t, Zt)(da)dt+ g(ZT ,mT )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt + g(X
∗
T ,mT )
]
,
where the last inequality is from the optimality part of the assumption that m is a strong MFE.
This inequality holds for any convergent subsequence of the tight sequence (Y n,1, βn(t,Y n),W 1),
and we conclude that
lim sup
n→∞
Jn1 (β
n,Λn,2, . . . ,Λn,n) = lim sup
n→∞
E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t, Y n,1t , ν
n
t , a)β
n(t,Y n)(da)dt + g(Y n,1T , ν
n
T )
]
≤ E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt+ g(X
∗
T ,mT )
]
.
9For a metric space (E,d), a point e0 ∈ E, and a sequence ξn of E-valued random variables, perhaps defined
on different probability spaces, recall that L(ξn) → δe weakly if and only if ξn → e in probability, which means
limn→∞ P(d(ξn, e0) > ǫ) = 0 for all ǫ > 0.
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On the other hand, notice that the convergence µn → m implies
lim
n→∞J
n
1 (Λ
n) = lim
n→∞E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,Xn,1t , µ
n
t , a)Λ
∗(t,Xn,1t )(da)dt + g(X
n,1
T , µ
n
T )
]
= lim
n→∞E
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
f(t, x, µnt , a)Λ
∗(t, x)(da)µnt (dx)dt + E
∫
Rd
g(x, µnT )µ
n
T (dx)
=
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
∫
A
f(t, x,mt, a)Λ
∗(t, x)(da)mt(dx)dt+
∫
Rd
g(x,mT )mT (dx)
= E
[∫ T
0
∫
A
f(t,X∗t ,mt, a)Λ
∗(t,X∗t )(da)dt+ g(X
∗
T ,mT )
]
,
where the second line used symmetry and the third used (7.2) to deal with the fact that Λ∗ may
be discontinuous. Recalling the previous inequality and (7.3), we conclude that ǫn → 0. 
7.2. Uncontrolled models and ill-posed ODEs. Weak MFE are easy to construct by build-
ing degenerate control problems into ill-posed McKean-Vlasov equations or ODEs, as illustrated
in this section. Suppose the drift function is the trivial
b(t, x,m, a) = B(m),
for some bounded continuous function B : Rd → Rd, where we again denote by m the mean of a
measure m ∈ P(Rd), if it exists. The state process (X1, . . . ,Xn) of the n-player game are then
un-controlled, and we do not even need to specify objective functions (f, g) or an action space
A. The dimension d is arbitrary. The state processes then evolve according to
dXit = B(µ
n
t )dt+ dW
i
t , µ
n
t =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt
, (7.4)
with i.i.d. initial states given by λ.
This is the unique n-player equilibrium, and the above SDE system (7.4) is unique in law.
But a broad range of n→∞ limiting behavior is possible here, and there are potentially multiple
(weak) MFE. Averaging (7.4) over i = 1, . . . , n, the empirical mean is seen to follow
dµnt = B(µ
n
t )dt+
1√
n
dW t,
whereW := 1√
n
∑n
k=1W
k is a Brownian motion. The sequence of real-valued processes (µnt )t∈[0,T ]
is easily seen to be tight (using, e.g., Aldous’ criterion for tightness [37, Lemma 16.12]), and it
is straightforward to check that every weak limit is supported on the set SODE ⊂ C([0, T ];R)
consisting of those functions x = x(t) satisfying the integral equation
x(t) = λ+
∫ t
0
B(x(s))ds, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (7.5)
It can be checked that a P(Rd)-valued process µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ] is a weak MFE if and only if
(µt)t∈[0,T ] belongs almost surely to SODE and µt is precisely
µt = Nd
(
λ+
∫ t
0
B(µs)ds, tI
)
,
where Nd(m,Σ) denotes the d-dimensional Gaussian law with mean vector m and covariance
matrix Σ. In particular, weak MFE are parametrized by mixtures of solutions of the ODE (7.5).
Of course, in some cases, such as if B is Lipschitz, this ODE has a unique solution. In
this case, there is a unique MFE, and the n-player equilibrium converges to it. But without
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uniqueness for (7.5), anything could happen. The vanishing noise limit n → ∞ may select one
particular solution, or it may fail to converge at all. See [1, 57] for examples of this phenomenon.
7.3. A game-theoretic example. We now turn to a more interesting example, in which the
nonuniqueness of the MFE comes from the game-theoretic aspect rather than from ill-posed state
process dynamics. In particular, this example admits many weak MFE which are not mixtures
of strong MFE. Consider the d = 1-dimensional mean field game described by the coefficients
b(t, x,m, a) = a, f ≡ 0, g(x,m) = xm, A = [−1, 1], λ = δ0,
where m =
∫
R
ym(dy). This example was analyzed in [43, Section 3.3]. It was shown in
Proposition 3.6 therein that there are precisely three strong MFE, m−1, m0, and m1, defined by
mct = L(ct+Wt), for c ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. (7.6)
On the other hand, there are infinitely many weak MFE, many of which are not mixtures of
these three strong MFE. In [43, Proposition 3.7], one such weak MFE was constructed explic-
itly, and we elaborate somewhat on this construction below. Note that [43] works with weak
MFG solutions in the sense of Definition 6.1 instead of our notion of weak semi-Markov MFE
(Definition 3.6), but we saw in Section 6 that the two are equivalent in a sense.
To construct a family of weak MFE, let t0 ∈ [0, T ], and let (Ω,F ,P) be any probability
space supporting a Brownian motion W and an independent random variable γ with P(γ =
1) = P(γ = −1) = 1/2. Define a P(Rd)-valued process µ = (µt)t∈[0,T ] by
µt =
{
L(Wt) if t ≤ t0
L(Wt + γ(t− t0) | γ) if t ∈ (t0, T ],
(7.7)
and note that the mean of µt is
µt = γ(t− t0)+. (7.8)
Suppose F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is the complete filtration generated by the processes (W,µ). In
particular, Ft = σ(Ws : s ≤ t) for t ≤ t0, and Ft = σ(Ws, γ : s ≤ t) for t ∈ (t0, T ]. Define the
state process
dX∗t = γ1(t0,T ](t)dt+ dWt, X
∗
0 = 0,
and define a control α∗t0 : [0, T ]× R→ R by
α∗t0(t, x) = sgn(x)1(t0 ,T ](t),
where
sgn(x) :=

1 if x > 0
−1 if x < 0
0 if x = 0.
Then γ = sgn(µt) for t > t0, and we can rewrite the dynamics of X
∗ as
dX∗t = α
∗
t0
(t, µt)dt+ dWt. (7.9)
We claim that (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗t0 ,X∗, µ) is a weak MFE in the sense of Definition 2.5. To
check that the consistency condition µt = L(X∗t | Fµt ) holds, note first that the σ-field Fµt :=
σ(µs : s ≤ t) is trivial if t ≤ t0 and is equal to σ(γ) if t ∈ (t0, T ]. Hence,
L(X∗t | Fµt ) = L
(
Wt +
∫ t
0
α∗t0(s, µs)ds
∣∣∣∣ Fµt ) = L (Wt + γ(t− t0)+ ∣∣ Fµt ) = µt.
48 DANIEL LACKER
We must lastly check that the control α∗t0 defined above is optimal. Fix an alternative semi-
Markov control α = α(t, x,m), and define the state process
dX ′t = α(t,X
′
t, µ)dt+ dWt, X
′
0 = 0.
The corresponding reward, using the fact that µ and W are independent, is
J(α) := E[X ′TµT ] = E
[∫ T
0
α(t,X ′t, µ)dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
α(t,X ′t, µ)E[µT | Ft]dt
]
= E
[∫ T
0
α(t,X ′t, µ)sgn(µt) dt
]
.
Indeed, the last step follows from the independence of W and µ, which yields
E[µT | Ft] =
{
µT = sgn(µT ) = sgn(µt) if t ∈ (t0, T ]
E[µT ] = 0 if t ≤ t0
= α∗t0(t, µt).
The optimizers of J(α) over α are precisely those α which satisfy
α(t,X ′t, µ) = α
∗
t0
(t, µt), for t ∈ (1, T ].
In particular, the control α∗t0 itself above is optimal, and we conclude that (Ω,F ,F,P,W, α∗t0 ,X∗, µ)
is a weak semi-Markov MFE.
Remark 7.1. This example notably illustrates weak MFE which are not mixtures of strong
MFE. Indeed, recall from (7.6) that the three strong MFE are m−1,m0,m1. The weak MFE µ
constructed above satisfies in particular P(|µT | = T − t0) = 1. Hence, unless t0 = 0 or t0 = T ,
this weak MFE is not a mixture of strong MFE.
The McKean-Vlasov equation in (7.9) is ill-posed (by design), which renders this example
difficult to analyze. Indeed, consider the set S∗t0 of m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) such that there exists
a solution of
dXt = α
∗
t0
(t,mt)dt+ dWt, X0 = 0, L(Xt) = mt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ].
Taking expectations, we find
dmt = α
∗
t0
(t,mt)dt, m0 = 0. (7.10)
This is an ill-posed ODE, and its solutions (on the time interval [0, T ]) are precisely the functions
{H±s : s ∈ [t0, T ]}, where
H±s (t) = ±(t− s)+, (7.11)
noting that H±T ≡ 0. Note then that S∗t0 consists of precisely the measure flows of the form
(L(Wt +H±s (t)))t∈[0,T ], for s ∈ [t0, T ].
On the other hand, suppose we construct the natural n-particle system
dXit = α
∗
t0
(t, µnt )dt+ dW
i
t , X
i
0 = 0, µ
n
0 =
1
n
n∑
k=1
δXkt .
Averaging over i = 1, . . . , n, we find that the empirical mean satisfies
dµnt = α
∗
t0
(t, µnt )dt+
1√
n
dW t, µ
n
t = 0, (7.12)
where W t =
1√
n
∑n
k=1W
k
t is a Brownian motion. One would expect that as n → ∞ the limit
points of (µnt )t∈[0,T ] are supported on solutions of the ODE (7.10). But, in fact, this is a well
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understood example of the “regularization by noise” phenomenon, and a particular mixture
is picked out in the limit n → ∞. Indeed, the law of (µnt )t∈[0,T ] converges to the mixture
1
2δH+t0
+ 12δH−t0
; this was proven in [57] in the case t0 = 0, and the extension to general t0 is
straightforward. In addition, one can deduce from this that the full measure flow µn, not just
its mean, converges in law in C([0, T ];P(Rd)) to µ defined in (7.7).
In light of this discussion, and after studying the proof of Theorem 2.11, it is natural to
guess that
αn,it0 (t,x) := α
∗
t0
(
t,
1
n
n∑
k=1
xk
)
(7.13)
defines an approximate (Markovian) Nash equilibrium for the n-player game, for any t0 ∈ [0, T ].
For t0 = T this is true and follows from Theorem 2.11, because the MFE µt = L(Wt) is strong
in this case. For general t0 ∈ [0, T ) it is not as clear, and we have resolved only the t0 = 0 case:
Proposition 7.2. Let αn = (αn,10 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ), where α
n,i
0 are defined as in (7.13) with t0 = 0.
Then there exists ǫn ≥ 0 with ǫn → 0 such that αn is a Markovian ǫn-Nash equilibrium for each
n. Moreover, the law of the Cd-valued random variable (µnt [αn])t∈[0,T ] converges to 12δH+0 +
1
2δH−0
.
Remark 7.3. On the other hand, suppose instead that we take γ to be 1, −1, or 0 with
P(γ = 1) = P(γ = −1) = p < 1/2 so that Eγ = 0 and P(γ = 0) > 0. Carrying out the exact
same construction as above, we arrive at another weak MFE in which (µ,X∗) once again obeys
the dynamics
dX∗t = α
∗
t0
(t, µt)dt+ dWt, X
∗
0 = 0, µt = L(Xt | Fµt ), a.s., ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
and again with µ satisfying both (7.8) and (7.7). The point is that in this case the law of
(µt)t∈[0,T ] is given by the mixture pδH+t0
+ pδ
H−t0
+ (1− 2p)δ0. This is not the mixture picked out
in the limit from the n-particle system (7.12), in which we saw that the law of µn converges to
1
2δH+t0
+ 12δH−t0
. In this case, it is not clear if this particular weak MFE can arise as the limit of
n-player approximate equilibria, but the naive construction certainly fails.
7.4. Proof of Proposition 7.2. Recall that our weak MFE µ satisfies µt = γt, where P(γ =
1) = P(γ = −1) = 1/2. The final claim of the Proposition, that the law of µn[αn] converges to
1
2δH+
0
+ 12δH−
0
, was shown in [57] .
Define
ǫn := sup
β∈AMn
Jn1 (β, α
n,2
0 , . . . , α
n,n
0 )− Jn1 (αn).
Note that ǫn ≥ 0, and by symmetry it holds for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n} that
ǫn = sup
β∈AMn
Jnk (α
n,1
0 , . . . , α
n,k−1
0 , β, α
n,k+1
0 , . . . , α
n,n
0 )− Jnk (αn).
Hence, αn = (αn,10 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ) is an ǫn-Nash equilibrium. It remains to show that ǫn → 0. A
direct calculation, using symmetry and the fact that |µnt [αn]| → t in law, shows that
Jn1 (α
n,1
0 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ) = E[X
1
T [α
n]µnT [α
n]] = E[|µnT [αn]|2]→ T 2
as n→∞. Hence, to show that ǫn → 0, it suffices to show that
lim sup
n→∞
sup
β∈AMn
Jn1 (β, α
n,2, . . . , αn,n) ≤ T 2. (7.14)
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To this end, for each n find βn ∈ AMn such that
sup
β∈AMn
Jn1 (β, α
n,2
0 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ) ≤ Jn1 (βn, αn,20 , . . . , αn,n0 ) +
1
n
. (7.15)
Abbreviate Xn = X1[(βn, αn,20 , . . . , α
n,n
0 )], Y
n = µn[(βn, αn,20 , . . . , α
n,n
0 )]. Abuse notation by
writing βnt = β
n(t,Xt[(β
n, αn,20 , . . . , α
n,n
0 )]). Then
dXnt = β
n
t dt+ dW
1
t ,
dY nt =
(
1
n
βnt +
n− 1
n
sgn(Y nt )
)
dt+
1
n
n∑
k=1
dW kt .
Finally, we view βn as a random variable with values in L21 := L
2([0, T ]; [−1, 1]). Equip L21 with
the subspace topology inherited from the weak topology of the Hilbert space L2([0, T ];R), and
note that L21 is then compact and metrizable.
Lemma 7.4. The sequence (Xn, Y n,W 1, βn) of C ×C×C×L21-valued random variables is tight,
and every weak limit (X,Y,W, β) satisfies:
(i) L(Y ) = 12δH+0 +
1
2δH−0
, where H±0 are defined in (7.11).
(ii) The following equations hold, for t ∈ [0, T ]:
Xt =
∫ t
0
βsds +Wt, Yt =
∫ t
0
sgn(Ys)ds.
(iii) W is a Brownian motion with respect to the filtration F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] defined by Ft =
σ(Xs, Ys,Ws, βs : s ≤ t).
(iv) Y and W are independent.
Proof. Tightness follows from standard arguments. Let (X,Y,W, β) denote any limit point.
Clearly (iii) holds. We first check that (i) holds by showing that the law of Y n converges weakly
to 12δH+0
+ 12δH−0
. Suppose that (Xn, Y n,W 1, . . . ,n , βn) are defined on the filtered probability
space probability space (Ωn,Fn,Fn,Pn). Define the Brownian motion W t = 1√n
∑n
i=1W
i
t . On
this space, let Zn denote the unique strong solution of the SDE
dZnt = sgn(Z
n
t )dt+
1√
n
dW t.
We know from [57] that Pn ◦ (Zn)−1 → 12δH+0 +
1
2δH−0
. Define an equivalent probability measure
Qn by setting
dQn
dPn
= exp
(
1√
n
∫ T
0
(βnt − sgn(Znt )) dW t −
1
2n
∫ T
0
(βt − sgn(Znt ))2 dt
)
.
By Girsanov’s theorem and uniqueness in law of the SDEs, we have Qn ◦ (Zn)−1 = Pn ◦ (Y n)−1.
This yields the following bound on relative entropy:
EP
n
[
dQn
dPn
log
dQn
dPn
]
= −EQn
[
log
dPn
dQn
]
=
1
2n
EQ
n
∫ T
0
(βt − sgn(Znt ))2 dt ≤
2T
n
.
By Pinsker’s inequality, the total variation norm of Qn − Pn converges to zero. Because Pn ◦
(Zn)−1 → 12δH+0 +
1
2δH−0
, we conclude that also Qn ◦ (Zn)−1 → 12δH+0 +
1
2δH−0
. Recalling that
Qn ◦ (Zn)−1 = Pn ◦ (Y n)−1, this completes the proof of (i).
CLOSED-LOOP MEAN FIELD GAME CONVERGENCE 51
With (i) now established, we prove (ii). It is clear that Xt =
∫ t
0 βsds +Wt holds, because
Xnt =
∫ t
0 β
n
s ds +W
n
t for each n and because L
2
1 ∋ q 7→
∫ t
0 qsds ∈ R is (weakly) continuous for
each t. Finally, note that (i) implies that Yt =
∫ t
0 sgn(Ys)ds for all t.
To check property (iii), note that the law of W is clearly equal to Wiener measure, so we
must only show that Wt − Ws is independent of Fs for each t > s ≥ 0. This argument is
straightforward and thus omitted.
We finally show that (iv) follows from the other claims. Because W is F-Brownian, it is
also F+-Brownian, where F+ = (Ft+)t∈[0,T ] denotes the right-continuous augmentation, defined
by Ft = ∩ǫ>0Ft+ǫ. In particular, W is independent of F0+. Now, from (i) we may write
Yt = t sgn(YT ) a.s., from which we conclude that the entire process Y is a.s.-measurable with
respect to F0+. Hence, Y and W are independent. 
With this Lemma in hand, we now complete the proof of Proposition 7.2. Working with a
subsequence of (Xn, Y n,W 1, βn) and its limit (X,Y,W, β), we have
lim
n
Jn1 (β
n, αn,20 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ) = limn
E[XnTY
n
T ]
= E[XTYT ] = E
[
YT
∫ T
0
βtdt+ YTWT
]
= E
[
YT
∫ T
0
βtdt
]
≤ TE|YT | = T 2,
with the limit taken along the appropriate subsequence. Note that the second equality is valid
in light of the simple estimate supn∈N E[|XnTY nT |p] < ∞ for any p > 1, which provides the
uniform integrability needed to pass to the limit. Finally, because this holds for each convergent
subsequence, we conclude finally from
lim sup
n→∞
Jn1 (β
n, αn,20 , . . . , α
n,n
0 ) ≤ T 2.
Recalling (7.14) and (7.15), this completes the proof. 
Appendix A. SDEs with random coefficients
This section develops some intuitively clear but somewhat delicate technical points regarding
SDEs with random coefficients. It will be useful to write FE = (FEt )t∈[0,T ] for the canonical
filtration on the path space C([0, T ];E), defined for any Polish space E.
For the rest of the section, fix a complete separable metric space E (which in applica-
tions in this paper will be E = P(Rd)). As in Definition 2.4, let us say that a function
B : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];E) → Rd is semi-Markov if it is Borel measurable and satisfies
F (t, x, e) = F (t, x, e′) whenever (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] ∈ Rd and e, e′ ∈ C([0, T ];E) satisfy es = e′s
for all s ≤ t. Fix throughout the section one such semi-Markov function B, which we assume
is bounded. Equip C([0, T ];E) with the supremum distance. We fix also a complete filtered
probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) supporting a d-dimensional F-Brownian motion W as well as an
F0-measurable Rd-valued random variable ξ with law λ.
The goal of this section is to justify the following points:
(1) Deterministic well-posedness: For a deterministic e ∈ C([0, T ];E), there is a unique
strong solution of the SDE
dXet = B(t,X
e
t , e)dt+ dWt, X
e
0 = ξ. (A.1)
Let P e ∈ P(Cd) denote its law. By “strong solution” here we mean Xe is adapted to the
complete filtration generated by the process (ξ,Wt)t∈[0,T ].
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(2) Stochastic well-posedness: If η is a C([0, T ];E)-valued random variable with law M ,
independent of (ξ,W ), then there is a unique strong solution of the SDE
dXt = B(t,Xt, η)dt + dWt, X0 = ξ. (A.2)
By “strong solution” we mean X is adapted to the complete filtration generated by the
process (ξ,Wt, ηt)t∈[0,T ].
(3) Consistency: The map C([0, T ];E) ∋ e 7→ P e ∈ P(Cd) is universally measurable and, in
the notation of part (2), provides a version of the conditional law of X given η. That is, for
each bounded measurable function ϕ on C([0, T ];E) × Cd, we have
E[ϕ(η,X)] =
∫
C([0,T ];E)
M(de)
∫
Cd
P e(dx)ϕ(e, x).
(4) Stability: Given a uniformly bounded sequence of semi-Markov functions Bn : [0, T ]×Rd×
C([0, T ];E)→ Rd satisfying Bn(t, x, e)→ B(t, x, e) for M -a.e. e and Lebesgue-a.e. (t, x), we
have
lim
n→∞E[ϕ(η,X
n)] = E[ϕ(η,X)]
for each bounded measurable function ϕ : C([0, T ];E) × Cd → R, where Xn is the unique
strong solution of
dXnt = Bn(t,X
n
t , η)dt+ dWt, X
n
0 = ξ. (A.3)
(5) Equivalence to forward equations: Suppose a continuous P(Rd)-valued process µ =
(µt)t∈[0,T ] is a weak solution of the randomized Fokker-Planck equation associated to (A.2).
Precisely, suppose µ is adapted to the filtration generated by η, and it holds almost surely
that, for all t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd),
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈λ, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
〈
µs, B(s, ·, η) · ∇ϕ(·) + 12∆ϕ(·)
〉
ds.
Then µt = L(Xt | (ηs)s≤t) a.s., for each t, where X is as in (A.2).
These results are applied in the text in the particular case E = P(Rd), and with µ = η in step
(5), but we find it clearer and perhaps useful on its own to work in this more general setting.
A.1. Deterministic well-posedness. Part (1) of the program follows from the result of Vereten-
nikov [59] (see also [41, Theorem 2.1]). That is, for each e ∈ C([0, T ];E) there exists a unique
strong solution Xe of the SDE (A.1). Let P e = P ◦ (Xe)−1. In particular, pathwise uniqueness
holds for this SDE, in the following sense: Suppose our probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) supports
two continuous F-adapted processes X1,X2 which both satisfy
dXit = B(t,X
i
t , e)dt+ dWt, X
i
0 = ξ, i = 1, 2,
and also as usual the process W is an F-Brownian motion independent of ξ. Then X1 = X2
a.s., and the law of X1 is precisely P e.
We would like to be able to construct a version of (t, ω, e) 7→ Xet (ω) which is jointly mea-
surable and which depends in an adapted fashion on e, but it is not clear how to do this.
Uniqueness of the strong solution Xe easily yields P(Xes = X
e˜
s , ∀s ≤ t) = 1 whenever t ∈ [0, T ]
and e, e˜ ∈ C([0, T ];E) satisfy es = e˜s for all s ≤ t. But the null set depends on (t, e, e˜), and we
thus face a continuum of null sets. There is no continuity in e to exploit, as we have made no
continuity assumptions on B, and this is the main technical impediment to our program (1-5).
Instead, we work with the law P e instead of the process Xe itself.
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In the following, let F
E
= (FEt )t∈[0,T ] denote the universal completion of FE. Precisely, if
N P denotes the set of P -null sets of the Borel σ-field on C([0, T ];E), then
FEt :=
⋂
P∈P(C([0,T ];E))
σ(FEt ∪ N P ).
Lemma A.1. The map C([0, T ];E) ∋ e 7→ P e ∈ P(Cd) is universally measurable. Moreover,
this map is adapted in the sense that, for every t ∈ [0, T ] and every S ∈ FRdt , the map e 7→ P e(S)
is FEt -measurable.
Proof. If t ∈ [0, T ], then uniqueness of the SDE ensures that if es = e˜s for s ≤ t then Xes = X e˜s
for all s ≤ t, a.s. Hence, if S ∈ FRdt , then P e(S) = P(Xe ∈ S) = P(X e˜ ∈ S) = P e˜(S), and we
deduce that the second claim will follow from the first.
First suppose that B(t, x, e) is continuous in e for each (t, x). We claim that then e 7→ P e is
continuous. To see this, suppose en → e in C([0, T ];E). It then holds for bounded continuous
function ϕ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd with compact support that
lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
B(t, x, en) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt =
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
B(t, x, e) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt.
It follows from [55, Theorem 11.3.3] that P e
n → P e.
We now address general B by an approximation argument. Fix a probability measure M ∈
P(C([0, T ];E)). Define the finite measure Q on [0, T ] × Rd × E by setting, for Borel sets S,
Q(S) =
∫
C([0,T ];E)
∫
Rd
∫ T
0
1S(t, x, e) exp(−|x|2)dtdxM(de).
We may then find a sequence of continuous semi-Markov functions Bn which converges Q-almost
everywhere to B. Define P en as the law of the corresponding SDE solution, i.e., P
e
n = P◦(Xn,e)−1
where Xn,e is given by
dXn,et = Bn(t,X
n,e
t , e)dt + dWt, X
n,e
0 = ξ.
As argued in the previous paragraph, e 7→ P en is continuous for each n. Moreover, it holds for
M -almost every e ∈ C([0, T ];E) that
lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
Bn(t, x, e) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt =
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
B(t, x, e) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt
for each bounded continuous function ϕ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rd with compact support. It follows
again from [55, Theorem 11.3.3] that P en → P e for M -a.e. e ∈ C([0, T ];E). Hence, the map
e 7→ P e agrees M -a.e. with a Borel measurable function, so it is measurable with respect
to the M -completion of the Borel σ-field of C([0, T ];E). As this holds for every choice of
M ∈ P(C([0, T ];E)), the proof is complete. 
A.2. Stochastic well-posedness. We now turn to steps (2) and (3) of the program outlined
at the beginning of the section, by proving weak existence and pathwise uniqueness for the SDE
(A.2) and then identifying the law of the unique solution as L(η,X) = M(de)P e(dx). As the
SDE (A.2) has random coefficients, the original form of the Yamada-Watanabe theorem does
not apply, and we instead use the generalization due to Jacod-Me´min [36] to conclude, as usual,
that weak existence and pathwise uniqueness are together equivalent to uniqueness in law and
existence of a strong solution. The first lemma checks that the SDE (A.2) is pathwise unique
and identifies its law (rather, it satisfies very good pathwise uniqueness in the language of [36,
Definition 2.24]).
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Lemma A.2. Let M ∈ P(C([0, T ];E)). Suppose our filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) sup-
ports an F-adapted continuous E-valued process η with law M , independent of (ξ,W ), as well
as two d-dimensional F-adapted processes (X1,X2) satisfying
dXit = B(t,X
i
t , η)dt+ dWt, X
i
0 = ξ, i = 1, 2.
Define Fξ,η,Wt := σ(ξ, ηs,Ws : s ≤ t), and assume that (X1s ,X2s )s∈[0,t] is conditionally indepen-
dent of Fξ,η,WT given Fξ,η,Wt , for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then X1 = X2 a.s., and P ◦ (η,Xi)−1 =
M(de)P e(dx) for each i = 1, 2.
Proof. By assumption, P◦η−1 =M . Let us show that e 7→ P e is a version of the conditional law
P(Xi ∈ · | η = e). Define the regular conditional law C([0, T ];E) ∋ e 7→ Qe = P(· | η = e) ∈ P(Ω).
Because W , ξ, and η are independent, we have Qe ◦ (ξ,W )−1 = P ◦ (ξ,W )−1 for M -a.e. e.
Moreover, the SDE
Xit = ξ +
∫ t
0
B(s,Xis, e)ds +Wt, ∀t ∈ [0, T ],
holds almost surely under Qe, for M -a.e. e.
We would like to conclude from pathwise uniqueness (see the first paragraph of Section A.1)
that Qe(X
1 = X2) = 1 and Qe ◦ (Xi)−1 = P e for M -a.e. e. To do so we need only to show
that W is an F˜-Brownian motion under Qe, for M -a.e. e, where F˜ = (F˜t)t∈[0,T ] denotes the
filtration (on Ω) generated by X1, X2, and W , i.e., F˜t = σ(Xs,Ws : s ≤ t). This amounts to
proving that for each t ∈ [0, T ], each σ(X1s ,X2s : s ≤ t)-measurable random variable ϕt(X), each
σ(Ws : s ≤ t)-measurable random variable ht(W ), and each σ(Ws −Wt : s ∈ [t, T ])-measurable
random variable ht+(W ), we have
EQe[ϕt(X)ht(W )ht+(W )] = E
Qe [ϕt(X)ht(W )]E
Qe [ht+(W )].
To prove this, notice that if ϕ : C([0, T ];E) → R is any bounded measurable function, then
(taking expectations under P)
E[ϕ(η)ϕt(X)ht(W )ht+(W )] = E[E[ϕt(X)|Fξ,η,WT ]ϕ(η)ht(W )ht+(W )]
= E[E[ϕt(X)|Fξ,η,Wt ]ϕ(η)ht(W )ht+(W )]
= E[E[ϕt(X)|Fξ,η,Wt ]ϕ(η)ht(W )]E[ht+(W )]
= E[ϕ(η)ϕt(X)ht(W )]E[ht+(W )]
Indeed, the second and final lines follow from the assumed conditional independence of (X1s ,X
2
s )s≤t
and Fξ,η,WT given Fξ,η,Wt , while the second to last identity follows from the fact that (ξ, η, (Ws)s≤t)
and (Ws −Wt)s≥t are independent, which is an easy consequence of the independence of ξ, η,
and W . We conclude that
E [ϕt(X)ht(W )ht+(W ) | η ] = E [ϕt(X)ht(W ) | η ]E[ht+(W )], a.s.,
which completes the proof. 
Now that we have checked pathwise uniqueness, we turn to the problem of existence. The
following lemma shows that we can construct (η,X) with law M(de)P e(dx) so that the SDE
(A.2) does indeed hold, as well as the conditional independence property of Lemma A.2. This
will be enough to deduce strong existence, using a form of the Yamada-Watanabe theorem [36,
Theorem 2.25].
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Lemma A.3. Let M ∈ P(C([0, T ];E)). Suppose our filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) sup-
ports an F-adapted continuous E-valued process η with law M , independent of (ξ,W ). Then
there exists a continuous F-adapted process X solving
dXt = B(t,Xt, η)dt+ dWt, X0 = ξ,
such that P ◦ (η,X)−1 = M(de)P e(dx). In particular, X is adapted to the complete filtration
generated by the process (ξ, ηt,Wt)t∈[0,T ].
Proof. Following the strategy described above, we begin by building a weak solution. We work
on the canonical space Ω = C([0, T ];E) × Cd. Let (η,X) denote the canonical (coordinate)
processes, and let F = (F t)t∈[0,T ] denote the filtration they generate, which can be written as
F t = FEt ⊗FRdt . Define P(de, dx) =M(de)P e(dx). For each t ∈ [0, T ], define Wt : Ω→ R by
Wt(e, x) = xt − x0 −
∫ t
0
B(s, xs, e)ds,
and define ξ := X0. The process W = (Wt)t∈[0,T ] is F-progressively measurable with respect
to the canonical filtration. Note that W (e, ·) is a Brownian motion on (Cd,FRd , P e), for each
e ∈ C([0, T ];E), by definition of P e. It follows easily that W is an F-Brownian motion under P.
Moreover, ξ, η, and W are independent. By construction, the SDE holds,
dXt = B(t,Xt, η)dt + dWt, X0 = ξ.
We will show that (Xs)s≤t is conditionally independent of Fξ,η,WT given Fξ,η,Wt for each t,
where Fξ,η,Wt := σ(ξ, ηs,Ws : s ≤ t). To prove this, fix t ∈ [0, T ] as well as random variables
ht(W ), ht+(W ), ϕ0(ξ), ϕt(X), ψt(η), and ψT (η), measurable with respect to (Ws)s≤t, (Ws −
Wt)s∈[t,T ], ξ, (Xs)s≤t, (ηs)s≤t, and η, respectively. Then, by definition of P,
EP [ht(W )ht+(W )ϕ0(ξ)ϕt(X)ψt(η)ψT (η)]
=
∫
C([0,T ];E)
M(de)ψt(e)ψT (e)
∫
Cd
P e(dx)ϕ0(x0)ϕt(x)ht(W (e, x))ht+(W (e, x))
= 〈W, ht+〉
∫
C([0,T ];E)
M(de)ψt(e)ψT (e)
∫
Cd
P e(dx)ϕ0(x0)ϕt(x)ht(W (e, x)), (A.4)
where W denotes Wiener measure on Cd, and where the last line used the fact that W (e, ·) is
a Brownian motion on (Cd,FRd , P e), mentioned above. Now, the independence of ξ, η, and W
easily implies
EP[ψT (η) | Fξ,η,Wt ] = EP[ψT (η) | Fηt ] =: ψ˜t(η).
Moreover, because the function Cd ∋ x 7→ ϕ0(x0)ϕt(x)ht(W (e, x)) is FRdt -measurable for each
fixed e, the adaptedness of e 7→ P e proven in Lemma A.1 implies that the function
C([0, T ];E) ∋ e 7→
∫
Cd
P e(dx)ϕ0(x0)ϕt(x)ht(W (e, x))
is FEt -measurable, and in particular it agrees M -a.e. with an FEt -measurable function. Hence,
we may conditionin on Fηt on the right-hand side of (A.4) to get
〈W, ht+〉
∫
C([0,T ];E)
M(de)ψt(e)ψ˜t(e)
∫
Cd
P e(dx)ϕ0(x0)ϕt(x)ht(W (e, x)),
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and we deduce from (A.4) that
EP [ht(W )ht+(W )ϕ0(ξ)ϕt(X)ψt(η)ψT (η)] = E
P[ht+(W )]E
P
[
ht(W )ϕ0(ξ)ϕt(X)ψt(η)ψ˜t(η)
]
.
Finally, recall that
ψ˜t(η)E
P[ht+(W )] = E
P[ψT (η) | Fξ,η,Wt ]EP[ht+(W ) | Fξ,η,Wt ],
which yields
EP [ht(W )ht+(W )ϕ0(ξ)ϕt(X)ψt(η)ψT (η)]
= EP
[
ht(W )ϕ0(ξ)ϕt(X)ψt(η)E
P[ψT (η) | Fξ,η,Wt ]EP[ht+(W ) | Fξ,η,Wt ]
]
= EP
[
ht(W )ψt(η)ϕ0(ξ)E
P[ϕt(X) | Fξ,η,Wt ]EP[ψT (η) | Fξ,η,Wt ]EP[ht+(W ) | Fξ,η,Wt ]
]
.
This proves the desired conditional independence (and in fact a bit more).
Finally, we complete the proof in the manner announced before the statement of the lemma.
It is well known (see, e.g., [8, Theorem 3]) that the following are equivalent:
(1) Every Fξ,η,W -martingale is an Fξ,η,W,X-martingale, where Fξ,η,W,X = (Fξ,η,W,Xt )t∈[0,T ] is
defined by Fξ,η,W,Xt = σ(ξ, ηs,Ws,Xs : s ≤ t).
(2) (Xs)s≤t is conditionally independent of Fξ,η,WT given Fξ,η,Wt for each t ∈ [0, T ].
This shows that our conditional independence property is in fact equivalent to the notion of very
good solution measure in [36, Definition 1.7]. Thus, by [36, Theorem 2.25], we conclude that the
solution measure is in fact strong, which means in our context that X must be adapted with
respect to the P-completion of Fξ,η,W . 
A.3. Stability. We turn next to part (4) of the outline from the beginning of the section.
Suppose Bn : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];E) → Rd is semi-Markov, for each n. Assume that Bn are
uniformly bounded and that Bn(t, x, e) → B(t, x, e), for M -a.e. e ∈ C([0, T ];E) and Lebesgue-
a.e. (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd. Thanks to the work of the previous section, we may define Xn as the
unique strong solution of the SDE (A.3) corresponding to coefficient Bn. That is,
dXnt = Bn(t,X
n
t , η)dt + dWt, X
n
0 = ξ.
Lemma A.4. Let M ∈ P(C([0, T ];E)). Suppose our filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) sup-
ports an F-adapted continuous E-valued process η with law M , independent of (ξ,W ). Then,
for every bounded measurable function h : C([0, T ];E) × Cd → R, we have
lim
n→∞E[ϕ(η,X
n)] = E[ϕ(η,X)] (A.5)
In particular, (η,Xn) converges in law to (η,X).
Proof. From Lemmas A.2 and A.3, we know that P◦(η,Xn)−1 =M(de)P en(dx), where we define
P en := P ◦ (Xn,e)−1 as the law of the unique strong solution of the SDE
dXn,et = Bn(t,X
n,e
t , e)dt+ dWt, X
n,e
0 = ξ.
By assumption, for any bounded continuous function ϕ : [0, T ]×Rd → Rd with compact support,
we have
lim
n→∞
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
Bn(t, x, e) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt =
∫ T
0
∫
Rd
B(t, x, e) · ϕ(t, x)dxdt,
for M -a.e. e. It follows from [55, Theorem 11.3.3] that P en → P e for M -a.e. e. It follows
immediately that M(de)P en(dx) → M(de)P e(dx) weakly. To prove that convergence holds for
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bounded measurable test functions, we need a bit more. Let Wλ ∈ P(Cd) denote the law of a d
Brownian motion started from initial law λ. Then
dP en
dWλ (w) = exp
(∫ T
0
Bn(t, wt, e)dwt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|Bn(t, wt, e)|2dt
)
.
Because Bn is uniformly bounded, it is straightforward to show that
sup
e∈C([0,T ];E)
sup
n∈N
∫
Cd
∣∣∣∣ dP endWλ
∣∣∣∣2 dWλ <∞.
This implies that the family {dP en/dWλ : n ∈ N, e ∈ C([0, T ];E)} is precompact in L2(Wλ) with
the weak topology, and this is enough to let us upgrade the convergence. Indeed, we conclude
that
lim
n→∞
∫
Cd
hdP en =
∫
Cd
hdP e, ∀e ∈ C([0, T ];E),
not only for bounded continuous functions h : Cd → R but also for bounded measurable functions.
Finally, if h : C([0, T ];E) × Cd → R is bounded and measurable, we conclude from dominated
convergence that
lim
n→∞
∫
C([0,T ];E)
∫
Cd
h(e, x)P en(dx)M(de) =
∫
C([0,T ];E)
∫
Cd
h(e, x)P e(dx)M(de).
This is equivalent to the claimed (A.5). 
A.4. Forward equations. Let E and B be as in the previous section. Let λ denote the law of
the initial state ξ. Consider the problem of finding (mt)t∈[0,T ] ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) such that
〈mt, ϕ〉 = 〈λ, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
〈ms, B(s, ·, e) · ∇ϕ(·) + 12∆ϕ(·)〉ds, (A.6)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd). This is nothing but the Fokker-Planck equation associated
with the SDE (A.1). One solution is provided by the marginal flow (P et = L(Xet ))t∈[0,T ], and
the following gives uniqueness.
Lemma A.5. Fix e ∈ C([0, T ];E), and suppose m ∈ C([0, T ];P(Rd)) satisfies (A.6) for every
t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd). Then mt = P et for all t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. It is well known that the solution of a Fokker-Planck equation, in very general settings,
can be represented as the marginal laws of a solution of the corresponding martingale problem.
See, e.g., [24, Theorem 2.6] or [58, Theorem 2.5]. In our context, the martingale problem has a
unique solution given by P e, and the claim follows. 
Lemma A.6. Suppose our filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) supports an F-adapted contin-
uous E-valued process η, independent of (ξ,W ), as well as a continuous P(Rd)-valued process
µ which is adapted to the filtration generated by η. Suppose it holds almost surely that, for all
t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd),
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈λ, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
〈
µs, B(s, ·, η) · ∇ϕ(·) + 12∆ϕ(·)
〉
ds, (A.7)
Then µt = P
η
t for all t ∈ [0, T ] a.s. Moreover, we may find a continuous process X, adapted to
the complete filtration generated by the process (ξ,Wt, ηt)t∈[0,T ], such that
dXt = B(t,Xt, η)dt + dWt, X0 = ξ, (A.8)
and also L(Xt | η) = L(Xt | (ηs)s≤t) = µt a.s. for each t.
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Proof. LetM ∈ P(C([0, T ];E)) denote the law of η. As we assumed µ is adapted to the filtration
of η, we may write µ = µ̂(η) a.s., where µ̂ : C([0, T ];E) → C([0, T ];P(Rd)) is an adapted map
in the sense that µ̂−1(S) ∈ FP(Rd)t for each S ∈ FEt and each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then because of (A.7),
for M -a.e. e ∈ C([0, T ];E) and every ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd) and t ∈ [0, T ] it holds that
〈µ̂t(e), ϕ〉 = 〈λ, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
〈
µ̂s(e), B(s, ·, e) · ∇ϕ(·) + 12∆ϕ(·)
〉
ds.
From Lemma A.5 we conclude that µ̂t(e) = P
e
t for each t ∈ [0, T ]. As this holds for almost every
e, we deduce the first claim: µt = P
η
t for all t, a.s.
Now, using Lemmas A.2 and A.3, we may safely define X to be the unique strong solution of
the SDE (A.8), and we know that P◦(η,X)−1 =M(de)P e(dx). This last identity is equivalent to
L(X | η) = P η a.s. Marginalizing at time t and using the conclusion of the previous paragraph,
we find L(Xt | η) = P ηt = µt for all t, a.s.
Lastly, to deduce that L(Xt | η) = L(Xt | (ηs)s≤t), note that for any bounded measurable
ϕ : Rd → R we have E[ϕ(Xt) | η] = 〈µt, ϕ〉. As µt is (ηs)s≤t-measurable, we may condition on
(ηs)s≤t to get E[ϕ(Xt) | (ηs)s≤t] = 〈µt, ϕ〉. 
We finally note how Lemma A.6 specializes in the most important situation for this paper,
where E = P(Rd) and the processes η and µ are identical. Assume now that B : [0, T ] × Rd ×
C([0, T ];P(Rd))→ Rd is a given bounded semi-Markov function (in the sense of Definition 2.4).
Corollary A.7. Suppose our filtered probability space (Ω,F ,F,P) supports an F-adapted con-
tinuous P(Rd)-valued process µ, independent of (ξ,W ). Suppose it holds almost surely that, for
all t ∈ [0, T ] and ϕ ∈ C∞c (Rd),
〈µt, ϕ〉 = 〈λ, ϕ〉 +
∫ t
0
〈
µs, B(s, ·, µ) · ∇ϕ(·) + 12∆ϕ(·)
〉
ds, (A.9)
Then we may find a continuous process X, adapted to the complete filtration generated by the
process (ξ,Wt, µt)t∈[0,T ], such that
dXt = B(t,Xt, µ)dt+ dWt, X0 = ξ,
and also L(Xt |µ) = L(Xt | Fµt ) = µt a.s. for each t, where Fµt = σ(µs : s ≤ t).
Appendix B. Joint measurability of regular conditional laws
This section provides the details of a technical point used in various places in the paper,
notably in the proof of Lemma 5.3. Therein, we wanted to define a regular conditional law in a
way that is jointly measurable with respect to the underlying probability law. The first lemma
in this direction is likely known, but we include a proof. Recall that for a Polish space E we
always equip P(E) with the topology of weak convergence and the corresponding Borel σ-field.
Lemma B.1. Let E and E′ be Polish spaces, and let π : E → E′ be continuous. Then there
exists a measurable map Γ : P(E) × E′ → P(E) such that∫
E
F (x)h(π(x))m(dx) =
∫
E
(∫
E
F dΓ(m,π(x))
)
h(π(x))m(dx),
for all bounded measurable F : E → R and h : E′ → R.
Proof. To write this in a more probabilistic notation, let X : E → E denote the identity map.
What we must find is a version of the regular conditional law m(X ∈ · |π(X) = x′) which is
jointly measurable as a function of (x′,m) ∈ E′ × P(E). We borrow a construction of [49,
Lemma 3.1]. Because E′ is Polish, we may find a refining sequence of finite Borel partitions
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(An1 , . . . , A
n
n) of E
′ such that ∪nσ(An1 , . . . , Ann) generates the Borel σ-field. For each n, define
Γn : P(E) ×E′ → P(E) by
Γn(m,x
′)(·) =
n∑
k=1
m(· ∩ π−1(Ank))
m(π−1(Ank )
1An
k
(x′),
where we adopt the convention 0/0 := 0. As E is Polish, we may find a countable sequence (ϕk)
of bounded continuous functions such that P(E) ∋ m 7→ (〈m,ϕk〉)k∈N ∈ RN is a homeomorphism
to its image. Because the σ-algebras σ(An1 , . . . , A
n
n) increase in n by design, the supermartingale
convergence theorem ensures that for each m ∈ P(E) the limn
∫
ϕk dΓn(m,x
′) exists for m◦π−1-
almost every x′ and is a version of the conditional expectation Em[ϕk(X) |π(X) = x′]. Now,
fixing x0 ∈ E arbitrarily, we may set
Γ(m,x′) :=
{
limn Γn(m,x
′) if the limit exists
δx0 otherwise,
where the limit is in the sense of weak convergence. Then, with the help of the sequence (ϕk)
from above, we deduce that for each m ∈ P(E) the map x′ 7→ Γ(m,x′) is a version of the regular
conditional law m(X ∈ · |π(X) = x′). As Γn is jointly measurable for each n, so too is Γ. 
We now turn to the real purpose of this section. In the following, let Ω be a Polish space. Let
E be a complete and separable metric space, and let X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] be a measurable process.
By measurable here we mean that the function X : [0, T ] × Ω → E is jointly Borel-measurable.
We show next how to construct a version of P (· |Xt = x) which is jointly measurable in t,
x, and the underlying probability measure P . Let EP [·] denote expectation with respect to a
probability measure P ∈ P(Ω).
Lemma B.2. There exists a jointly measurable function Γ : [0, T ] × E × P(Ω) → P(Ω) such
that, for every bounded measurable function F : [0, T ]× Ω→ R and each P ∈ P(Ω), we have
EP [F (t, ·) |Xt] =
∫
Ω
F (t, ·) dΓ(t,Xt, P ), P − a.s., a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. Consider the measurable space Ω = [0, T ]×Ω and E = [0, T ]×E, and define π : Ω→ E
by π(t, ω) = (t,Xt(ω)). Apply Lemma B.1 to find a measurable function Γ : P(Ω)×E → P(Ω)
such that for each P ∈ P(Ω) it holds that Γ(P , ·) is a version of the conditional law P (· |π).
Let U denote the uniform probability measure on [0, T ]. Then, for P ∈ P(Ω) and bounded
measurable functions F : Ω→ R and h : E → R, we have
1
T
EP
∫ T
0
F (t, ·)h(t,Xt)dt
=
∫
Ω
∫ T
0
F (t, ω)h(π(t, ω))U(dt)P (dω)
=
∫
[0,T ]×Ω
h(π(t, ω))
(∫
Ω
F dΓ(U × P, π(t, ω))
)
(U × P )(dt, dω)
=
∫
[0,T ]×E
h(t, x)
(∫
Ω
F dΓ(U × P, (t, x))
)
(U × P ) ◦ π−1(dt, dx)
=
∫
[0,T ]×E
h(t, x)
(∫
Ω
F dΓ(P, t, x)
)
(U × P ) ◦ π−1(dt, dx),
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where we define Γ˜ : P(Ω)× E → P(Ω) by setting Γ˜(P, t, x) := Γ(U × P, (t, x)). Note next that∫
[0,T ]×E
g(t, x)(P × U) ◦ π−1(dt, dx) = 1
T
EP
∫ T
0
g(t,Xt)dt,
for any bounded measurable g : E → R. Hence, the above becomes
1
T
EP
∫ T
0
F (t, ·)h(t,Xt)dt = 1
T
EP
∫ T
0
h(t,Xt)
(∫
Ω
F dΓ˜(P, t,Xt)
)
dt.
For a measure P ∈ P(Ω) = P([0, T ] × Ω), let P T and PΩ denote the [0, T ] and Ω marginals,
respectively. By choosing F depending only on t, we find that Γ˜(P, t,Xt)
T = δt a.s. for a.e.
t ∈ [0, T ]. Finally, define Γ : [0, T ]× E × P(Ω)→ P(Ω) by marginalizing, e.g., setting
Γ(t, x, P ) := Γ˜(P, t, x)Ω.
Then
Γ˜(P, t,Xt) = Γ(t,Xt, P )× δt, a.s., a.e. t ∈ [0, T ],
and we find
1
T
EP
∫ T
0
F (t, ·)h(t,Xt)dt = 1
T
EP
∫ T
0
h(t,Xt)
(∫
Ω
F (t, ·) dΓ(t,Xt, P )
)
dt.
This is enough to complete the proof (see [9, Lemma 5.2]). 
Appendix C. Conditional means of random measures
This section gives some details regarding one additional technical point, relevant in various
applications of the Markovian projection Theorem 2.14 in settings involving relaxed controls,
which is to construct a measurable version of the conditional mean of a random measure. This
is formalized in the following lemma, stated in a setting abstract enough to allow for the various
applications we have in mind.
Lemma C.1. Suppose Γ : E 7→ P(Ω) is a measurable map. Suppose also that K : Ω→ P(A) is
measurable. Then there exists a measurable function Λ : E → P(A) such that, for every bounded
measurable function ϕ : E ×A→ R and every x ∈ E, we have∫
A
ϕ(x, a)Λ(x)(da) =
∫
Ω
(∫
A
ϕ(x, a) dK(ω)(da)
)
Γ(x)(dω).
Proof. We use the following well known fact: For any Polish space E, the Borel σ-field on P(E)
coincides with the σ-field generated by the collection of maps P(E) ∋ m 7→ ∫ ϕdm ∈ R, where
ϕ ranges over bounded Borel-measurable real-valued functions of E. (See [6, Corollary 7.29.1].)
Define Λ(x)(S) for Borel sets S ⊂ A and x ∈ E by setting
Λ(x)(S) =
∫
Ω
K(ω)(S) Γ(x)(dω).
For each x ∈ E, it is clear that Λ(x)(·) is a probability measure on A. On the other hand,
for each Borel set S ⊂ A, the map ω 7→ K(ω)(S) is Borel measurable in light of the above
fact, and thus so is x 7→ Λ(x)(B). We conclude that Λ defines a measurable map from E to
P(A), and the claimed identity holds whenever ϕ(x, a) = 1S(a) for a Borel set S ⊂ A. It is
straightforward to extend this to any ϕ of the form ϕ(x, a) = ψ(a), for ψ : A → R bounded
and measurable. Because the identity holds pointwise, for each x ∈ E, we can then extend to
general ϕ = ϕ(x, a). 
One of the main purposes of the abstract considerations of Sections B and C is the following:
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Lemma C.2. Suppose we are given, on some Polish probability space (Ω,F ,P), a measurable
P(A)-valued process β = (βt)t∈[0,T ] as well as a measurable E-valued process X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ].
Then there exists a jointly measurable function β̂ : [0, T ]×E → P(A) such that, for each bounded
measurable function ϕ : [0, T ] × E ×A→ R, we have∫
A
ϕ(t,Xt, a) β̂(t,Xt)(da) = E
[∫
A
ϕ(t,Xt, a)βt(da)
∣∣∣∣ Xt] , a.s., a.e. t ∈ [0, T ].
We may write this with the suggestive mean measure notation,
β̂(t,Xt) = E[βt |Xt].
Proof. By Lemma B.2, a version of the regular conditional law Γ(t, x) = P(· |Xt = x) ∈ P(Ω)
can be constructed which is jointly measurable in (t, x). Then simply apply Lemma C.1. 
Lastly, in the proof of Lemma 5.3, we need the following:
Lemma C.3. Suppose we are given, on some Polish probability space (Ω,F ,P), a jointly
measurable function β : [0, T ] × Rd × Ω → P(A), as well as a continuous E-valued pro-
cess η = (ηt)t∈[0,T ]. Let Fηt = σ(ηs : s ≤ t). Then there exists a semi-Markov function
Λ : [0, T ]× Rd × C([0, T ];E) → P(A) such that
Λ(t,Xt, η) = E[β(t,Xt, ·) | Fηt ], a.s., for each t ∈ [0, T ].
That is, for each bounded measurable function ϕ : [0, T ] × Rd × C([0, T ];E) ×A→ R, we have∫
A
ϕ(t,Xt, η, ·) dΛ(t,Xt , η) = E
[∫
A
ϕ(t,Xt, η, ·) dβ(t,Xt , ·)
∣∣∣∣ Fηt ] , a.s., for each t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. This will follow immediately from Lemma C.1 once we can construct a version of the
conditional law P(· | Fηt ) which is progressively measurable in (t, η). In fact, noting that Fηt =
σ(η·∧t), this follows from Lemma B.2 applied with X = (Xt)t∈[0,T ] therein given by the stopped
process (η·∧t)t∈[0,T ]. 
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